23 82. In most cases, non-appearance has been resorted to aiming at exerting pressure upon the complaining party and the Court, but experience shows that nonappearing States have hardly gained anything - except criticisms - from such harmful conduct84. Furthermore, it is to be kept always in mind that non-appearance and noncompliance are not synonymous at all; non-appearing - or "disappeared" - States are under the duty to comply with Judgments in absentia (pacta sunt servanda). 83. On this particular subject, the Institut de Droit International adopted a clarifying resolution 85 in its session of Basel of 1991, in which it took into account the difficulties that non-appearance of a party may present to the other party and to the Court itself86. In its preamble, the resolution pondered inter alia that "the absence of a party is such as to hinder the regular conduct of the proceedings, and may affect the good administration of justice" 87. The resolution recalled, in its operative part, the State's "duty to cooperate in the fulfilment of the Court's judicial functions" (Article 2), and added that "Each State entitled (...) to appear before the Court and with respect to which the Court is seized of a case is ipso facto (...) a party to the proceedings, regardless of whether it appears or not" (Article 1). 84. The resolution of the Institut further provided that, notwithstanding the nonappearance of a State, this latter remains "bound by any decision of the Court in that case, whether on jurisdiction, admissibility or the merits" (Article 4). And the resolution concluded that "a State's non-appearance before the Court is in itself no obstacle to the exercise by the Court of its functions" (Article 5). This is an accurate statement of the applicable law in cases of non-appearance, which by no means can be taken to lead to non-compliance, amounting to an additional violation of international law. IV. The Expanding Material Content and Scope of Jus Cogens in Contemporary International Law. 85. May I conclude this Separate Opinion in the present Caesar case in a positive tone, with an expression of support for the present Judgment in absentia of the InterAmerican Court, in respect particularly to two remaining aspects that I see it fit to dwell upon here. Firstly, the Court has expressly and rightly admitted in the present Caesar case that, in certain circumstances, the existence of a law (such as that of Corporal Punishment Act of Trinidad and Tobago), manifestly incompatible with the relevant provisions of the American Convention (Article 5(1) and (2)), may per se constitute - by its nature and effects - a violation of this latter 88. In support of this view, may I refer to my arguments, to this effect, in my Dissenting Opinion in the El Amparo case, concerning Venezuela (Judgments on reparations, of 14.09.1996), as well as in my Dissenting Opinion in the Caballero Delgado and Santana case, 84 . As illustrated by the regrettable and much-criticized "withdrawal" of the United States in the Nicaragua case, which it eventually lost in the merits (in 1986) as well; cf. ibid., pp. 67 and 71-72. 85 . I.D.I., 4th. Commission, rapporteur G. Arangio Ruiz. 86 . Institut de Droit International, Resolution on Non-Appearance before the International Court of Justice, of 31.08.1991, preamble, 6th. considerandum. 87 . Ibid., 5th. considerandum. 88 . Paragraphs 73-74 and 93-94 of the present Judgment.