6 fundamental rights of the human person (with the prompt derogation of those laws), as well as, given the circumstances of each case, to provide reparation for the consequences of the wrongful situation created (para. 11). 17. Also in my Concurring Opinion in the above-cited cases Barrios Altos (para. 9) and “The Last Temptation of Christ” (paras. 96-98), as well as in my earlier Dissenting Opinion in the Caballero Delgado y Santana Case (Reparations, 1997, paras, 13, 14, and 20), I insisted in modifying the domestic laws as necessary to bring them into accordance with the system of protection established in the American Convention as part of the non-monetary reparations under Article 63(1) of the Convention. The Court has established the same reparation, in my opinion correctly, in the present Case of Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago. The violation incurred by the very existence of the Offences Against the Person Act (for the way in which it punishes the crime of murder) is aggravated by its application via death sentences. Suspending the execution of capital punishment, in addition to a form of reparation, avoids incurring an additional violation of the Convention. 18. Recall that the Human Rights Committee (under the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) has consistently maintained that the imposition of the death penalty following a trial without legal due process guarantees, and without the possibility of a review mechanism to challenge the sentence, constitutes a per se violation of the right to life (in violation of Article 6 of the Covenant). 21 Said violation exists independently of whether the death sentence is carried out, even if those sentenced to death are still alive. It intends to avoid additional harm. 19. There is no way, based solely on examining the circumstances of the crime, to separate those into factors that aggravate, mitigate or discharge criminal responsibility. The consideration of said circumstances is inherent in the exercise of judicial power. Accordingly, it has been thought that legality and equity are two distinct, but inseparable, aspects of judicial consideration; and so much so that legality is impossible without equity, and equity is likewise impossible without legality. 22 It is not surprising that the most articulate contemporary doctrine has distanced itself from the theory of retribution (central to the supposed objective of the death penalty), which is inconsistent with the social aim of punishment (which, in addition, should be limited by the degree of criminal responsibility of the perpetrator). 23 21 Cf. See its decisions in the following cases: C. Wright v. Jamaica (1992, para. 8.7), L. Simminds v. Jamaica (1992, para. 8.5), A. Little v. Jamaica (1991, para. 8.6), and R. Henry v. Jamaica (1991, para. 8.5). 22 L. Ferrajoli, Derecho y Razón – Teoría del Garantismo Penal, 5th ed., Madrid, Editorial Trotta, 2001 p. 162 and cf. pp. 158 and 160. 23 The punishment (in general) also attempts to achieve the objective of judicial certainty. But the death penalty (or legalized murder) goes beyond degrees of guilt, completely excluding social readaptation (of the convict); moreover, it is the most radical form of corporal punishment, which is applied to the body of the convicted.