10 treatment), but did not affirm that the death penalty per se violated Article 3 of the Convention. 33 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, bearing in mind the circumstances surrounding the Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. Case, has gone even farther in the present Judgment on the merits and reparations, in establishing the incompatibility of the “mandatory” death penalty with the American Convention, and ordering, as one of the means of reparation, the stay of the execution of this penalty. 30. In addition to the aforementioned considerations, it would be difficult to avoid the assertion that there is no method of carrying out the death penalty that would not be cruel, inhuman and degrading. In its landmark sixteenth Advisory Opinion on The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law (1999) – which serves as guidance and inspiration in statu nascendi for this matter, - the Inter-American Court cautioned that, in a case that leads to the application of the death penalty in the absence of due process guarantees, the violation of the right to not be arbitrarily deprived of life 34 will be added to the violation of the due process guarantees and becomes a premeditated, government-sanctioned judicial murder. 31. Such a violation raises questions, which, once again, transcend the sphere of positive law. An entire value system naturally underlies the wide debate that is sparked by these questions. 35 To affirm, in the name of society, that a person should be executed, that his life should be put to an end for being entirely evil, leads to the assumption – which no person with common sense would agree with today – that society is entirely good. As Camus stated, where nothing authorizes the government to “definitively legitimate” or “produce something irreparable”; he who judges absolutely condemns himself absolutely. The great writer wisely added that this may be explained by the assertion that Ill n’y a pas de justes, mais seulement des coeurs plus ou moins pauvres en justice. Vivre, du moins, nous permet de le savoir et d’ajouter à la somme de nos actions un peu du bien qui compensera, en partie, le mal que nous avons jeté dans le monde. Ce droit de vivre que coincide avec la chance de réparation est le droit naturel de tout homme, même le pire. (..) Sans ce droit, la vie morale est strictement impossible. (…) Ni dans le coeur des individus ni dans les moeurs des sociétés, il n’y aura de paix durable tan que la mort ne sera pas mise hors la loi. 36 33 For a general overview of the application of this provision of the European Convention, cf., H. Fourteau, L’application de l’article 3 de la Convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme dans le droit interne des Etats members, Paris, LGDJ, 1996, pp. 1ss. 34 For a general overview of this issue in relation to the death penalty, cf., e.g., W.A. Schabas, op. cit. infra n. (44), pp. 3-303, esp. pp. 126, 138, 144, 229; A. Salado Osuna, La Pena de Muerte en Derecho Internacional- Una Excepción al Derecho a la Vida, Madrid, Tecnos, 1999, pp. 1-278; Amnesty International, When the State Kills… The Death Penalty v. Human Rights, London, A.I., 1989, pp.68-70. 35 36 Paragraph 137 and resolving point No. 7 in the aforementioned Advisory Opinion. A. Camus, op. cit. supra n. ( ), pp. 159-160, 164, 166 and 170. [Translation: There are no just persons, only hearts that are more or less impoverished in justice. Living, at the very least, allows us to recognize and aggregate to the sum of our actions the little bit of good that will compensate, in part, for the evil that we have unleashed into the world. This right to life that coincides with the opportunity for reparation is the natural right of every man, even the worst. (…) Without this right, a moral life is strictly impossible. (…) Neither the heart, nor individuals, nor societal practices will have lasting peace while death is not placed outside the grasp of the law. (Translation by the Secretariat)