19 official temporarily in charge of their functions. Likewise, the Commission argued that Ms. Herrera’s statement “does not conform to the object of testimony requested from witness Gómez Pav[aj]eau” and that it “only [makes] reference to the practices of the National Procurator” and does not refer to the facts about which the witness was called to testify in the order to convene the public hearing. Further, the representatives added that “a large part of [the statement] is totally irrelevant” and “[w]hat is relevant is the information included on page 28 of the statement, which confirms that the disciplinary action in three disciplinary proceedings put forward concerning the massacre of The Rochela was timebarred and therefore, no state official was disciplinarily sanctioned in relation to the case.” For its part, the State indicated that “it acknowledges that it cannot argue […] that due to vacation periods at the domestic level it cannot present evidence,” however, in good faith it presents the statement and submits it for observation from the other parties. On this issue, the Court finds that the statement includes information about the disciplinary investigations that were put forward in response to the events of the Rochela Massacre. The Court adds the information included in the statement that specifically refers to the facts of the Rochela Massacre to the body of evidence, pursuant to Article 45(1) of the Rules of Procedure and because it considers it useful in deciding this case. 62. The State indicated that “the statement presented by Guillermo Pérez Casas was not presente[d] before a notary public, or before any authority” and that the original and complete version “was presented extemporaneously”, which “abridges the State’s right of defense”, reasons for which it requests that “it not be taken into consideration” in the analysis of the case. In this regard, the Tribunal notes that on other occasions it has admitted sworn statements that were not given before a notary public when this does not affect juridical security or the procedural balance between the parties,27 which have been respected and guaranteed in this case. However, taking into consideration that the complete version of the this statement was presented extemporaneously, and that it contains evidence that could be useful in deciding the present case, the Tribunal includes it in the body of evidence, founded upon Article 45(1) of the Rules of Procedure, and taking into account the observations presented by the State. 63. The Court takes note of the State’s observations with regard to the statements of María Carmenza Morales Cepeda, Myriam Stella Morales Caro, Antonio Suárez Niño, Iván Cepeda Castro and Federico Andreu Guzmán, in the sense that “the context [presented in the application and in the brief containing pleadings and motions] is not in debate” in the present case. This argument will be analyzed in the present Judgment (infra para. 69 to 72 and 76 to 91). 64. In application of Article 45(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Court includes in the body of evidence in the present case the judgment C-014 issued on January 20, 2004 by the Constitutional Court of Colombia, the Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Colombia issued on October 14, 1993 by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (OEA/Ser. L/V/II.84 Doc. 39 rev. 14 October 1993), as well as the following evidence produced in the case of the 19 Tradesmen: Legislative Decree 3398 of December 24, 1965; Law 48 of December 16, 1968; the judgment issued on April 14, 1998 by the National Tribunal [Tribunal Nacional]; and the Report of the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations on Summary or Arbitrary Executions with regard to a visit completed on 11th to the 20th of October 1989 (E/CN.4/1990/22/Add.1 of January 24, 1990). 27 Cf. Case of the Miguel Castro Castro Prison, supra note 8, para. 189; Case of Servellón García et al., supra note 19, para. 46; and Case of Claude Reyes et al. Judgment of September 19, 2006. Series C No. 151, para. 51.