67 been involved in the events, were not examined in the disciplinary tribunals. This fact not only eliminates any type of effectiveness of these proceedings, but also accentuates the situation of defenselessness of the victims and the lack of will to effectively investigate and punish, albeit disciplinarily, those members of the security forces that participated in or permitted the events of the Rochela Massacre in one way or another. 213. Regarding the second disciplinary investigation, on September 12, 2005, the Court takes note of the disciplinary proceedings opened with regard to some judicial official allegedly responsible for grave negligence in the handling of the case. According to Colombia, disciplinary proceedings were opened on September 12, 2005 against the Second Public Order Judge of Pasto [Juez Segunda de Orden Público de Pasto] and four special prosecutors from the Terrorism Sub-Unit for “alleged unjustified delays in processing the criminal proceedings related to the events of ‘The Rochela.’”223 However, the final decisions of these proceedings were not submitted to this Court. 214. Moreover, the Court notes that the disciplinary officials did not investigate the alleged obstruction of the investigation by senior military commanders (supra para. 172 to 175) or the alleged support provided by police inspectors and other civilian authorities to the paramilitary groups in the area.224 215. The Court reiterates that, obviously, the very existence of a disciplinary procedure within the Procurator General’s Office to look into cases of human rights violations has an important protective purpose and the corresponding results can be assessed to the extent that they contribute to clarifying the facts and establishing this type of responsibility. A disciplinary procedure can complement but not entirely substitute the function of the criminal courts in cases of grave human rights violations.225 d) Proceedings in the Contentious Administrative Courts 216. In this case, and as described in greater detail in the section on reparations (infra para. 239 and 241), the State granted compensation at the domestic level through contentious administrative proceedings and judicially certified settlement agreements. In this regard, the Court observes that the decisions adopted by the contentious administrative courts do not contain a statement on the State’s responsibility for the violation of rights such as the rights to life and to personal integrity, among other rights embodied in the Convention. Likewise, they do not address certain issues of rehabilitation, truth, justice and the rescue of the historical memory, or measures to guarantee non-repetition. 223 773). Cf. State’s reply brief (record of the merits and possible reparations and costs, volume III, pages 772 and 224 Cf. report of March 15, 1989 by the Administrative Security Department (DAS) (record of evidences to the application, volume II, evidence A35, pages 656, 657, 658 and 660); report of February 13, 1990 by the Administrative Security Department (DAS) (record of evidences to the application, volume II, evidence A35, pages 686, 710, and 711); affidavit by Federico Andreu Guzmán of January 19, 2007 (record of witness statements and expert reports, volume III, page 7512); and expansion of interrogatory statement by Alonso de Jesús Baquero Agudelo of August 3, 1995 before the Technical Investigative Corps (record of evidences to the brief containing pleadings and motions, volume VI, evidence 47, pages 3489 to 3491). 225 Cf. Case of the Ituango Massacres, supra note 15, para. 333; and Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre, supra note 12, para. 203.