3 by the examination and ruling by the Court, and are not conditioned by dispositive acts by one of the parties. 12. The reception by the Court of concepts which have arisen in procedural law, perfectly justified and in fact necessary, allows the determination of the reach of concepts which conform to well-established doctrine on that subject and which thereinafter the international courts of human rights may take advantage. This reception helps understanding with regard to acts of international procedure, the effects which natural flow from them, the condition of the procedural subjects (especially the parties), the role of other participants in the proceedings, the legitimization of the proceedings, etcetera. 13. In several opinions which I have attached to Judgments of the Court, I have been concerned with recalling the characteristics of admissions and acquiescence, which may have the effect –along with other elements subject to the Court’s findings- of producing a ruling which declares the violation (the declarative part of the comprehensive judicial ruling) and determines the legal consequences (the punitive part of that ruling), and with these an evaluation of the international responsibility of the State in the case sub judice. 14. I have sought to associate these reflections with the most credible procedural doctrine. So, for example, in my opinion corresponding to the Judgment in the Case of Bulacio v. Argentina, of September 18, 2003, I observed that two procedural concepts coincide in an acknowledgment of responsibility, both of them with material repercussions, bearing in mind the scope of said recognition: confession and acquiescence. In point of fact, as stated by Alcalá-Zamora, acquiescence is “an act of disposition, or a waiver of rights:” a renunciation of the right to legal defense. “[C]onfession refers to factual statements and acquiescence refers to legal claims” (Proceso, autocomposición y autodefensa (Contribución al estudio de los fines del proceso), Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, 3d ed., Mexico, 1991, p. 96). 15. In the Case of Bueno Alves Judgment, the Court does not enter into a discussion of international responsibility as mentioned by the State–which is, of course, a central issue in the proceedings, and instead includes in the concept of acquiescence both this issue and the admission. The Court analyzes each concept separately and with the corresponding characterization and effects: the first concept, as an admission of facts, reduces the conflict over the related evidence; the other, as an acceptance of the claims of the opposing party under certain juridical terms, guides the substance of the litigation. 16. In effect, it is said: a) “This Tribunal understands that the State, upon having accepted the conclusions of the Report (of the Inter-American Commission) and upon refraining from challenging the facts that the Commission alleged in its application, has admitted to them. These facts constitute the factual basis of these proceedings” (para. 26); and b) “This Court finds that the ‘acceptance’ by the State (with regard to the conclusions contained in the Report by the Commission regarding the violation of certain precepts of the Convention) constitutes an acquiescence to the Commission’s claims of law” (para. 30) (emphasis supplied).