which deals with the ban contained in this subparagraph which the constitutional lawmaker instituted for the purpose of preventing the dynastic or nepotism-based transmission of power and preventing a candidate who is standing for an elected office by universal suffrage from participating in an election under conditions of superiority compared to other candidates, with a clear breach of the principle of equality adopted by the democratic system. 53 68. Furthermore, in connection with presidential reelection, the IACHR notes that it has been regulated in various ways by states in the region, with the establishment of absolute bans in certain systems, relative bans on continuous or consecutive reelection in others, allowing one or two reelections at the most in others, and allowing presidential reelections without any limits in yet other systems. 54 The IACHR underscores that, in the present case, there is no need to conduct an abstract review of each system and its compatibility with the American Convention, but rather to examine the reasons and conditions for which the electoral process might lead to a breach of the right of a candidate to participate on equal terms. Regarding this, reference has been made to various national bodies and courts, on the basis of the terms indicated below. 69. Regarding this, the Venice Commission, in its report on term-limits for presidents, stated the following: 83. (…) [I]t seems that the circumstances that generated the most common restriction to the right to stand for office (for example, the need to prevent incumbents from taking advantage of their position in order to remain in power or abuse state’s resources, persist in most contemporary democracies. 85. At any rate, as long as there is no theoretical, international or constitutional foundation to recognize reelection as a human right, it should be conceived as an autonomous clause, linked with the right to political participation and of the right to stand for election. In any case, term limits or other limitations of the right to run for office in different ways, for example, prohibiting re-election of political officers, restricting the number of consecutive terms an official can serve or forbidding consecutive re-election of any public official, impose restrictions on the human right to political participation. As such, they must be justified by a legitimate aim, be necessary in a democratic society, and be reasonable. 127. Presidential term limits are entrenched in the Constitution; a constitutional amendment is therefore required to modify them. Only the people who have lawful sovereign power can modify the scope of authority which they gave to the president. A decision to alter or remove presidential term limits should be subject to thorough public scrutiny and debate, and should fully respect the relevant constitutional and legal procedures. 128. To the extent that constitutional amendments strengthening or prolonging the power of high offices of state are proposed, such amendments (if enacted) should have effect only for future holders of the office, not for the incumbent. 130. As regards the possible role of Constitutional or Supreme courts, they should intervene after the relevant amendment has been adopted by the constitutional legislator pursuant to the relevant, special constitutional requirements. The possibility for the Court to carry out a substantive a posteriori review that the amendment adopted is not in breach of “unamendable” provisions or principles should only be exercised in those countries where it already follows from clear and established doctrine, and even there with care, allowing a margin of appreciation for the constitutional legislator. 55 70. As for the Constitutional Court of Colombia, in its judgment C 141-2010, it ruled that convening a constitutional referendum proposing an amendment to the Constitution which would read as follows was unconstitutional: “whoever has been elected to be the president of the republic for two constitutional terms of office can only be elected for one other term of office.” Regarding this the Court underscored the risks to democracy stemming from prolonged reelections, especially in those cases where the President has the authority to appoint officials in monitoring bodies and the judicial branch of government. It also highlighted Constitutional Court, Appeal for Judgment of Amparo. Case File 2906-2011, August 8, 2011. See European Commission for Democracy through law (Venice Commission), The Limitation of Consecutive Terms in Elected Office, Comparative Table, 19 July 2012. 55 Study No. 908/2017, Strasbourg, March 20, 2018. Report on Term-Limits, Part I – Presidents. Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 114th plenary session (Venice, 16-17 March 2018), para. 99. 53 54