4 point: general international law must into account, at the same time as treaty-based international law. 10. Herein lies an element that I believe to be of fundamental importance: acts that are considered genocide or grave violations of international humanitarian law under different international treaties and conventions (including the American Convention) were already prohibited by general international law, even before the entry into force of those treaties or conventions. The universal recognition of the above-mentioned principle of humanity can be mentioned in this regard.14 11. According to the abiding message of a great philosophical jurist, “even if the laws themselves were not in force, at least their content was in force” before the atrocities of the twentieth century were committed in different latitudes: “in other words,” continued G. Radbruch: “the content of those laws responds to a law which is above the law (...). From which we see that, following a century of juridical positivism, the idea of a law which is above the law resuscitates (...). The way towards the solution of these problems is implicit in the name given to the philosophy of law in the ancient universities and which, after many years of disuse, has re-emerged today in the name and concept of natural law.”15 12. We should not forget that in the Case of J.-P. Akayesu (Judgment of September 2, 1998), the ad hoc International Tribunal for Rwanda considered that the concept of crimes against humanity had “already been recognized a long time before” the Nuremberg trials (1945-1946) (para. 565). The Martens clause contributed to this (cf. infra). Indeed, expressions similar to the one relating to that crime, invoking humanity as a victim, “appear much earlier in human history (para. 566). The same International Tribunal for Rwanda indicated in the Case of J. Kambanda (Judgment of September 4, 1998) that, “in all periods of history, genocide has inflicted massive losses on humanity,” and its victims are both those massacred and humanity itself (in both acts of genocide and in crimes against humanity) (paras. 15-16).16 13. It is evident that the substance of the condemnation of grave violations of human rights, acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, and other atrocities, was already engraved on the human conscience a long time before they were typified or codified at the international level, either in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, or in other human rights or international humanitarian law treaties. Nowadays, international crimes are condemned by both general and treaty-based international law. This development has been fostered by the universal juridical conscience, which, in my opinion, is the ultimate material source of all law. 14 In this regard, it has already been indicated that: "it is increasingly believed that the role of international law is to ensure a minimum of guarantees and of humanity for all, whether in time of peace or in time of war"; J. Pictet, The Principles of International Humanitarian Law, Geneva, ICRC, 1966, pp. 29-30. 15 G. Radbruch, Introducción a la Filosofía del Derecho [Vorschule der Rechtsphilosophie], 3a. ed. in Spanish, México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1965, p. 180. 16 The same considerations can be found in the judgments of the same Court in the Case of J.P. Akayesu cited above, and also in the Case of O. Serushago (Judgment of February 2, 1999, para. 15).