6 24. The requirements for confinement of persons with mental illness are not stated with such detail –even though the rules, principles and statements on this issue have certainly multiplied- pretending that their freedom or confinement, justified by the need for treatment –a controversial concept when used in relation to prison inmates, but that is broadly accepted in the cases of persons with mental illness- is less worthy of protection of the right to personal freedom. On the contrary, said right only deserves a lighter protection when there is a justification that so mandates, based on the law, and not only on the personal opinion of the therapist, relative or administrative authority. 25. Owing to their human condition and in spite of their suffering, persons with mental illness enjoy rights that can only be legitimately affected by legally founded and duly taken measures, consistent with the characteristics of the suffering and the need for treatment, which are as reasonable and moderate as practicable and aim at relieving pain and foster well-being. Criminals or minors, who eventually managed to escape the rule of force –or, at best, the rule of mere benevolence- to live under the rule of law and reason enjoying the right to exercise lawful powers and have access to guarantees, have not evolved to the same extent, if any, and with the same intensity, whatever it might be, as persons with mental illness who are more exposed to the restrictions and decisions of custodians and professionals. 9. DELEGATION OF SERVICES AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY 26. The events that resulted in the death of Ximenes-Lopes unfolded while he was held under therapeutic treatment in a private health institution that acted, in turn, by delegation of the State. The observance of the universal right to health protection, which has evolved both in the national and the international levels, forms the operating framework of the health system in which public and private agents interact under the supervision of the State at different levels. This is the basis of the different treatment models that are subject to administrative procedures: from strict public centralization to free provision of professional services. 27. It is not my purpose –as it was not the Court’s purpose in the Judgment with which this Opinion concurs- to discuss those models and assess their advantages and disadvantages. It is worth noting that, however, in line with the statements of the Judgment, when the State delegates the provision of services that have been inherently placed under its domain –because they involve social rights protected by the State- it does not completely dissociate itself from –in other words, it is not released from liability- the assistance provided to the person whose care has been delegated to a third party. Said delegation is public and the relationship between the delegating State and the delegatee therapist develops within the public order context. The private therapist carries out in action the tasks that are incumbent upon the State and for which the State is completely liable; that is to say, it answers for them, irrespective of the fact that the delagatee entity or subject is also answerable to the State. 28. It is possible to draw a line between mere supervision –which does not entail, however, absolute detachment or institutional indifference- on the part of the State over private entities, either individual professionals or health institutions, that render services to users (patients) under a private law relationship, though based on a public or social interest, and the material liability of the State when it takes part in a private entity, by mutual agreement and with it, that operates under a public law