The Code of Criminal Procedure of that State establishes in Article 458 that [a]ny person who is charged with infringing the precepts contained in [that] Code and is kept in detention may apply to be released to a higher Court than the one that has ordered the deprivation of his liberty. [...] The application shall be made in writing. [...] Immediately upon receipt of the application, the Judge who is to hear it shall order the detained person to be brought before him and shall hear his statements, which shall be included in a record which shall be signed by the Judge, the Secretary and the applicant, or, should the applicant be unable to sign, by a witness on his behalf. Thereupon, the Judge shall seek to obtain all the information he deems necessary for the purpose of arriving to a conclusion and ensuring the lawfulness of his decision and shall, within forty-eight hours, decide what he deems to be lawful.7 This Court shares the Commission's view that the right enshrined in Article 7(6) of the American Convention is not exercised with the mere formal existence of the remedies it governs. Those remedies must be effective, since their purpose, in the terms of Article 7(6), is to obtain without delay a decision "on the lawfulness of [his] arrest or detention," and, should they be unlawful, to obtain, also without delay, an "order [for] his release". The Court has also held that [i]n order for habeas corpus to achieve its purpose, which is to obtain a judicial determination of the lawfulness of a detention, it is necessary that the detained person be brought before a competent judge or tribunal with jurisdiction over him. Here habeas corpus performs a vital role in ensuring that a person's life and physical integrity are respected, in preventing his disappearance or the keeping of his whereabouts secret and in protecting him against torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment (Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 of January 30, 1987. Series A No. 8, para. 35).8 24. In regard to violation of Article 7, the Commission considers the actions for amparo presented by the Petitioner to be sufficient to exhaust domestic remedies. Furthermore, the Commission considers those same actions for amparo capable of resolving the questions of violations against the rights of liberty and physical and mental integrity.9 Thus the Commission concludes that the Petitioner did exhaust domestic remedies in regard to Article 5 of the Convention, as he filed for amparo twice and had both requests denied (once in court and the other simply ignored with no explanation given). These action foramparo did not lead to the Petitioner being freed or to the Ecuadorian authorities carrying out an investigation of the Petitioner’s complaint that his human and constitutional rights had been violated while he was being detained. Said actions proved ineffective and could be called a “formality devoid of meaning”. 25. In Velásquez Rodríguez the Court stated that: The mere fact that a domestic remedy does not produce a result favorable to the petitioner does not in and of itself demonstrate the inexistence of exhaustion of all effective domestic remedies. For example, the petitioner may not have invoked the appropriate remedy in a timely fashion. 7 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Suárez Rosero case, Judgment of November 12, 197, paragraph 59. Ibid, paragraph 63 9 Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27.2, 25.1 and 7.6 American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion 8/87 of January 30, 1987, paragraph 35. 8 5