stage, in report No. 174-2016-JUS / PPES of September 12, 2016 21, the State made reference to the fact that Mr. Cuya Lavy had exhausted the remedies. 29. Regarding Mr. Díaz’s petition No. 739–08, in response to the Commission's communication of November 20, 2013, in its report No. 35-2014-JUS / PPES of March 5, 2014 22, at the admissibility stage, the State indicated that it has provided effective judicial remedies to Mr. Díaz, in accordance with the rules of due process, all within the obligation to guarantee the free and full exercise of the rights recognized in the American Convention. 30. From the foregoing, as regards the petitions of Messrs. Cuya and Díaz, it does not appear that the State has filed the objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies during the admissibility stage before the Commission. 31. Regarding Mr. Valenzuela’s petition No. 948-04, in response to the Commission's communication of May 6, 2009, in its report No. 197-2014-JUS / PPES of December 1, 2014 23, at the admissibility stage, the State indicated that “to the extent that the plaintiff did not duly exhaust the means provided in domestic law, he did not comply with the mandatory requirement of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies provided for in Article 46(1)(a) of the American Convention, and in that sense, the present petition must be declared inadmissible.” 32. Regarding petition No. 1065-08, from Ms. Rodríguez in response to the Commission's communication of January 14, 2014, in its report No. 81-2014-JUS / PPES of May 19, 2014 24, at the admissibility stage, the State considered that the admissibility requirement regarding the filing and exhaustion of domestic remedies had not been met. It added that "at the time of the alleged infringing act, the country had a suitable remedy to which it could resort: the right of amparo." In addition, it argued that the writ of amparo filed by Ms. Rodríguez was declared inadmissible at all instances for failing to comply with the requirement of the fundamental process of its presentation within the legal term established in internal regulations. Therefore, it requested the inadmissibility of the petition, "since the petitioner had not presented a timely remedy to exhaust the domestic jurisdiction." 33. From the above information available to this Court, it appears that the State specifically argued during the admissibility stage before the Commission that the petitions of Mr. Valenzuela and Ms. Rodríguez were inadmissible, on the grounds that the petition had not complied with the exhaustion of domestic remedies. Regarding Mr. Valenzuela's petition, the State did not specifically mention the suitable and effective remedy that should be exhausted, and regarding Ms. Rodríguez's petition it only alluded to the lateness of the filing of the writ of amparo without establishing the suitability and effectiveness of said remedy. 34. For the reasons stated, the Court rejects the aforementioned preliminary objection, since: (i) it was not presented in a timely manner in relation to Messrs. Cuya and Díaz; (ii) in relation to Mr. Valenzuela, the State, at the admissibility stage before the Commission, did not specify which remedies he should exhaust, and (iii) in relation to Ms. Rodríguez, it did not explain why the 21 Cf. Report No. 174-2016-JUS/PPES of the State related to the petition filed by Mr. Cuya at the merits stage of September 12, 2016 (merits file, fs. 3182 to 3192). 22 Cf. Report No. 35-2014-JUS/PPES of the State related to the petition filed by Mr. Díaz at the admissibility stage of March 5, 2014 (evidence file, fs. 954 to 963). 23 Cf. State Report No. 197-2014-JUS/PPES related to the petition filed by Mr. Valenzuela at the admissibility stage on December 1, 2014 (evidence file fs. 2531 to 2542). The State provided said report and argued that said report is not part of the file forwarded by the Commission to the Court, thus affecting the State's right to defense, Mr. Walter Antonio Valenzuela failed to exhaust the domestic remedies provided for in the legislation regarding the questioning of the due substantiation and its possible link with the principle of legality, as stated in report No. 159/18, for which the State did not have the opportunity to know and internally repair a possible violation of rights. 24 Cf. Report No. 81-2014-JUS/PPES of the State related to the petition filed by Ms. Rodríguez at the admissibility stage of May 19, 2014 (evidence file, fs. 1157 to 1164). 11