35 * c) * * Mr. Neptune’s right to recourse to contest the deprivation of liberty (Article 7(6) of the Convention) 112. The Commission alleged that the State was responsible for the violation of Article 7(6) in relation to Article 25(1) of the Convention, given that “Mr. Neptune was not guaranteed his right to recourse and there is no evidence on record indicating that Mr. Neptune was otherwise afforded access to a competent court or tribunal to exercise his right to judicial protection.” 153 The Commission mentioned that the guarantees established in Articles 7(6) and 25 of the Convention “together seek to avoid arbitrariness and unlawfulness in the application of pre-trial detention”154 and that the State’s obligation to grant a judicial recourse implies that it must “adopt affirmative measures to guarantee that the recourses it provides through the justice system are truly effective in establishing whether there has been a violation of human rights and in providing redress.”155 113. The representative alleged the violation of Article 7(6) of the Convention, because he considered that the State had not complied with the time limits for bringing Mr. Neptune before his natural judge, to decide a motion for disqualification filed against the judges of the Court of Saint-Marc and to decide on the appeal against the closing order.156 114. The Court has understood that, according to the text of Article 7(6) of the Convention, the holder of the “right to have recourse to a competent judge or court [so that the latter] may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his arrest or detention” corresponds to the person “deprived of his liberty,” although “the recourses may be filed for himself or by another person.” 157 Unlike the right embodied in Article 7(5) of the Convention, which imposes on the State the obligation to respect and guarantee it ex officio, Article 7(6) protects the right of the person deprived of liberty to recourse to a judge, irrespective of the observance of his other rights and of the judicial activity in his specific case, which implies that the person detained effectively exercises this right, in the assumption that he can do so, and that the State effectively provides this recourse and rules on it. 115. In situations of deprivation of liberty, such as those of the instant case, among the essential judicial guarantees, habeas corpus represents the appropriate means for guaranteeing the liberty and controlling respect for the life and integrity of the person, and also for protecting the personal integrity of the individual. 158 Obviously the name, 153 Cf. Application submitted by the Commission, supra note 3, para. 102 (folio 125). 154 Cf. Application submitted by the Commission, supra note 3, para. 97 (folio 124). 155 Cf. Application submitted by the Commission, supra note 3, para. 101 (folio 125). 156 Cf. Final written arguments presented by the representatives, supra note 65, para. 77 (folio 285). 157 Case of La Cantuta, supra note 40, para. 112. 158 Cf. Neira Alegría et al. v. Perú. Merits. Judgment of January 19, 1995. Series C No. 20, para. 82; Case of La Cantuta, supra note 42, para. 111, and Serrano Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of March 1, 2005. Series C No. 120, para. 79. See also, Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6) American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 of January 30, 1987. Series A No. 8, para. 35.