9 c) Contrary to what the State contends, the claimants were under no obligation to resort to the civil courts or to have Mr. Durand Ugarte and Mr. Ugarte Rivera declared presumed dead under the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code. The Court has held that the only remedies under domestic law that must be exhausted are those that are adequate and effective; in the case of the forced disappearance of persons, the applicable remedy is that of habeas corpus. If this remedy is pursued and decided without satisfactory result, then the requirements stipulated Article 46(1)(a) of the Convention have been met. 33. On previous occasions, the Court explained the purpose of this exception and pointed out that failure to exhaust local remedies is purely a question of admissibility and that the State that alleges such failure is required to prove that local remedies remain to be exhausted and that they are effective.2 34. In a case of forced disappearance, the Court has repeatedly held that the remedy of habeas corpus “would be the normal means of finding a person presumably detained by the authorities, of ascertaining whether he is legally detained and, given the case, of obtaining his liberty.”3 This Court has also held that the remedy of habeas corpus must be effective; in other words, it must be capable of producing the result for which it was designed.4 35. The Court considers that these findings apply with equal force to the case of the disappearance of Mr. Durand Ugarte and Mr. Ugarte Rivera and that the procedures mentioned by the State (having the person legally declared missing and/or presumed dead) are intended to serve other purposes having to do with inheritance; they are not, however, intended to shed light on a disappearance that constitutes a violation of human rights and are therefore not suited to achieving the result being sought in the instant case.5 36. Having studied the facts in the instant case, the Court has established that the remedy of habeas corpus was used on two occasions: 2. Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987. Series C No. 1, para. 88; Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987. Series C No. 2, para. 87; Godínez Cruz Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987. Series C No. 3, para. 90; Gangaram Panday Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of December 4, 1991. Series C No. 12, para. 38; Neira Alegría et al. Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of December 11, 1991. Series C No. 13, para. 30; Castillo Páez Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of January 30, 1996. Series C No. 24, para. 40; Loayza Tamayo Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of January 31, 1996. Series C No. 25, para. 40, and Cantoral Benavides Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of September 3, 1998. Series C No. 40, para. 31. 3. Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, para. 65; Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of January 20, 1989. Series C No. 5, para. 68; Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case. Judgment of March 15, 1989. Series C No. 6, para. 90; Caballero Delgado and Santana Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of January 21, 1994. Series C No. 17, para. 64, and Habeas corpus under suspension of guarantees (Arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 of January 30, 1987. Series A No. 8, para. 35. 4. Castillo Páez Case, Preliminary Objections, supra 33, para. 40; Loayza Tamayo Case, Preliminary Objections, supra 33, para. 40, and Castillo Petruzzi et al. Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of September 4, 1998. Series C No. 41, para. 63. 5. Velásquez Rodríguez Case, supra 34, para. 66; Godínez Cruz Case, supra 34, para. 69, and Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, supra 34, para. 91.