2 recourse must be effective, that is, must be “capable of producing the result for which it was designed.”4 5. Even with that interpretation of the provision, my petitions are still valid regarding the fact that the creation of a simple and prompt recourse cannot be put aside in the development of the case -law of the Convention, which is, without any doubt, a description of the classic Latin-American writ of amparo, extremely useful for countless situations. I repeat what I have said on several occasions: the Court has used the idea of a simple and prompt recourse to examine the development of a criminal procedure, which is never simple nor prompt and has used the notion of a reasonable time as enshrined in Article 8 to evaluate the promptness of the recourse. I cannot agree with this idea. I neither agree with the idea of that, by unifying rights, the system is strengthened. The development of each right grants a greater range of possibilities to the individuals. 6. With regard to this case in particular, I believe that there were recourses, not the amparo, that were effective according to the definition of effectiveness provided by the Court. On the contrary, the proceeding that was initiated as a result of some of these resources had a delay that, in no way, can be considered reasonable and therefore, I agree with the opinion that there has been a violation of Article 8. Cecilia Medina Quiroga President Pablo Saavedra Alessandri Secretary 4 Case of Velásquez Rodríguez., para. 66