had expired on January 6 and 8, 2001; in other words, they were never considered to be refugees in Chile and reference was only made to their status of residents in that country. 183. Based on the above, the Court considers that, regardless of the unfavorable decision on the asylum request in Bolivia, the immigration authority that decided to expel the family and, in the circumstances of this case, also the prosecutor who issued the injunction addressed to the Director of SENAMIG, had the obligation to provide a reasoned decision on the admissibility of the cause for expulsion, and on the country to which the family should be transferred, in keeping with the special characteristics of the case. 184. In this regard, in addition to the fact that, in its answering brief, the State acknowledged that, in fact, the immigration authorities “had, at the very least, been informed” that they were refugees in Chile, it has been proved that the Government of Bolivia, as well as CONARE and the Ministry of Justice, Human Rights and Immigration, received the CEB-UNHCR communication advising that Mr. Pacheco and Mrs. Tineo were requesting refugee status, asking that they should not be returned to Peru owing to fear of persecution, and indicating their preference to go to Chile, where they had refugee status. In addition, the numerous measures taken by the Chilean Consulate in La Paz to try and ensure the transfer of the Pacheco Tineo family to Chile, including, on February 23, 2001, informing SENAMIG that the family’s entry into that country had been authorized and that the family had been provided with financial assistance for their transfer (payment of hotel and bus tickets). In other words, it is evident that the presumed victims were authorized to enter Chile, and that its Consulate had taken steps and incurred expenses to this end. This reveals that the State of Bolivia had numerous opportunities to confirm directly with official consular sources of this third State and from other sources, whether members of the Pacheco Tineo family had refugee status in Chile. In any case, the Consulate advised the Chief Adviser on Migratory Affairs that they had residence in Chile. Hence, as revealed by the documents issued by the Chilean Consulate, the Bolivian immigration authorities could have transferred the family to Chile and not to Peru, which had been agreed or, at least, considered by the said authorities, without it being relevant whether or not these Bolivian authorities were legally authorized to this end.238 185. Despite the foregoing, on February 23, 2001, SENAMIG decided to expel the members of the family from Bolivian territory, but failed to provide them with notification of this decision. The expulsion took place the following day, by detention, forced transfer, and the handing over of the Pacheco Tineo family on the border with the State of Peru to the immigration authorities and police of that country, specifically in the place known as El Desaguadero. 186. Also, on February 20, 2001, the Chief Adviser on Migratory Affairs had expressed the intention of expelling them from Bolivia and on the following day, February 21 – the same day as the CONARE decision – the Director of Immigration Services had advised the Chilean Consul ‘that this family would not be granted asylum and that it would be given a prudential period to determine its place of residence.” After the application for habeas corpus had been declared admissible, the Chief Adviser on Migratory Affairs expressed his discontent in this regard to the Chilean Consul, and advised him that the Government “would determine the procedure to follow and that what had occurred complicate[d] Mr. Pacheco’s situation (supra para. 92). The Chilean Consul then asked him to avoid taking drastic measures and, the following day, informed his Ministry of Foreign Affairs that, “following arduous negotiations with the Immigration Services,” it had been possible to prevent the deportation of the family that day and a verbal agreement 238 The State indicated, as regards the Immigration Directorate not respecting commitments to allow the departure of Mr. Pacheco and his family to Chile, that the 1963 Vienna Convention and the legal doctrine of international public law expressly establish that the only authorities who can make international commitments are the Ambassadors Plenipotentiaries and not officials of the former SENAMIG, who depended in hierarchy on the Ministry of the Interior. The Court considers this determination irrelevant, because even considered in these terms, the only point it would prove is that the immigration authorities had exceeded their legal competence, which in this case is irrelevant for the purposes of international law. 60