12 40. In this chapter, the Court will address the parties’ arguments on whether the imposition of a mandatory death sentence on the alleged victim violated his right to life. 41. The Commission alleged that “sentencing individuals to the death penalty through mandatory sentencing and absent consideration of the individual circumstances of each offender and offense leads to the arbitrary deprivation of life within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the Convention,” and “fails to limit the application of the death penalty to the most serious crimes, in contravention of Article 4(1) and 4(2)” of that instrument. According to the Commission, “Section 2 of the Offences Against the Person Act[, hereinafter “OAPA”, which] simply states that where a person is found guilty of murder, that person shall be sentenced to death[,] fails to differentiate between intentional killings punishable by death, and intentional killings (not merely manslaughter or other lesser form of homicide) that would not be punishable by death.” Additionally, mandatory death sentencing fails to provide a defendant with the opportunity “to present submissions and evidence in respect of all potentially mitigating circumstances relating to his or her person[, such as his or her] degree of culpability[, as well as] the offender’s character and record, subjective factors that might have motivated his or her conduct, the design and manner of execution of the particular offense, and the possibility of reform and social readaptation of the offender.” Thus, the Commission alleged that the State is responsible for the violation of Article 4(1) and 4(2) of the Convention because Mr. Cadogan “was not given an opportunity to present evidence of mitigating factors, nor did the courts have discretion to consider evidence of this nature in determining whether the death penalty was an appropriate punishment in the circumstances of [his] case.” 42. On the other hand, the Commission alleged that “the essential respect for the dignity of the individual that underlies Article 5(1) and 5(2) of the Convention [cannot be reconciled] with a system that deprives an individual of the most fundamental of rights without considering whether this exceptional form of punishment is appropriate in the circumstances of the individual’s case. In sum, the Commission f[ound] that the treatment of Mr. Cadogan in this manner abrogates the fundamental respect for humanity that underlies his right to be protected under Article 5(1) and (2) of the Convention.” 43. Finally, the Commission indicated that “Article 4(6) of the American Convention, when read together with Articles 8 and 1(1), places the State under the obligation to […] implement a fair and transparent procedure by which an offender sentenced to death may make use of all favorable evidence deemed relevant to the granting of mercy.” Additionally, the Commission alleged that “due process guarantees should […] be interpreted to include a right of effective review or appeal” as to the appropriate punishment in the circumstances of each case. 44. The representatives alleged the same violations of the American Convention as the Commission, and argued that “the mandatory death sentence condemn[ed the alleged victim] to death without consideration of his individual humanity. It subject[ed] him to an arbitrary deprivation of life, contrary to Article 4(1) of the Convention[, and i]t fail[ed] to ensure that the penalty of death [will be] imposed only for the most serious crimes, as required by Article 4(2) [of the Convention]. […] Further, contrary to Article 5(1) and (2) [of the Convention], it is cruel and inhuman and degrades his inherent dignity as a human person by not treating him as a uniquely individual being.” The representatives further submitted that “[t]he imposition of the death sentence on someone suffering from a mental those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition.”