14 to certain procedural guarantees, and compliance therewith must be strictly observed and reviewed.24 48. Specifically, in addressing the issue of mandatory death sentencing in other cases, the Court has held that the reference to “arbitrary” in Article 4(1) of the Convention and the reference to “the most serious crimes” in Article 4(2) render the imposition of mandatory death sentences incompatible with those provisions where the same penalty is imposed for conduct that can be vastly different, and where it is not restricted to the most serious crimes.25 49. The provisions of the Convention regarding the imposition of the death penalty must be interpreted in view of the pro persona principle, that is to say, they should be interpreted in favor of the individual26 as “impos[ing] restrictions designed to delimit strictly its application and scope, in order to reduce the application of the death penalty to bring about its gradual disappearance.”27 A.1) The limitation of the application of the death penalty to the “most serious crimes” 50. The Court has previously held that the intentional and illicit deprivation of another’s life (intentional or premeditated murder, in the broad sense) can and must be recognized and addressed in criminal law under various categories (criminal classes) that correspond with the wide range of seriousness of the surrounding facts, taking into account the different facets that can come into play: a special relationship between the offender and the victim [e.g. infanticide], motives for the behavior [e.g. for reward or remunerative promise], the circumstances under which the crime is committed [e.g. brutality], the means employed by the offender [e.g. poison], etc. This approach allows for a graduated assessment of the seriousness of the offence, so that it will bear an appropriate relation to the graduated levels of gravity of the applicable punishment.28 51. The Convention thus reserves the death penalty for the most serious crimes. Notwithstanding, Section 2 of the Offences Against the Person Act compels the indiscriminate imposition of the same punishment for conduct that can be vastly different,29 which is contrary to what the Convention establishes. 52. In the Boyce et al. case, this Court held that Section 2 of OAPA contravenes Article 24 Cf. Case of Fermín-Ramírez v. Guatemala. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of June 20, 2005. Series C No. 126, para. 79, and Case of Boyce et al., supra note 20, para. 50. See also Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American Convention on Human Rights), supra note 21, para. 55, and The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law. Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 of October 1, 1999. Series A No. 16, para. 135. 25 Cf. Case of Hilaire, Constantine, and Benjamin et al., supra note 22, paras. 103, 106, and 108; Case of Boyce et al., supra note 20, para. 51, and Case of Raxcacó-Reyes, supra note 22, paras. 81-82. 26 Cf. Case of the 19 Merchants v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of July 5, 2004. Series C No. 109, para. 173; Case of Boyce et al., supra note 20, para. 52, and Case of the Dismissed Congressional Employees (Aguado-Alfaro et al.) v. Peru. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 24, 2006. Series C No. 158, para. 77. 27 Case of Hilaire, Constantine, and Benjamin et al., supra note 22, para. 99, and Case of Raxcacó-Reyes, supra note 22, para. 56. See also Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American Convention on Human Rights), supra note 21, para. 57. 28 Case of Hilaire, Constantine, and Benjamin et al., supra note 22, para. 102, and Case of Boyce et al., supra note 20, para 53. 29 Cf. Case of Hilaire, Constantine, and Benjamin et al., supra note 22, para. 103, and Case of Boyce et al., supra note 20, para. 54.