30 access to highly trained, professional[,] and independent psychiatrists [who are available] throughout the entire criminal prosecution process.” 104. The Court notes once again the State’s expressed willingness to comply in full with the Boyce et al. Judgment. Nevertheless, considering that the legislative or other measures ordered in Boyce et al. have not yet been implemented – and in order to remedy the violations declared in the present Judgment – the Tribunal reiterates that the State must adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to ensure that the imposition of the death penalty does not contravene the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Convention, and in particular, that it is not imposed through mandatory sentencing. In this regard, the State must adopt such legislative or other measures as are necessary to ensure that the Constitution and laws of Barbados, particularly Section 2 of the Offences Against the Person Act and Section 26 of the Constitution, are brought into compliance with the American Convention. The State must comply with these measures of reparation within a reasonable time as of the date of notification of the present Judgment. 105. Additionally, as a measure of reparation and in order to guarantee that events such as those analyzed in the present Judgment are not repeated, the State shall ensure that all persons accused of a crime whose sanction is the mandatory death penalty are duly informed, at the initiation of the criminal proceedings against them, of the right to obtain a psychiatric evaluation carried out by a state-employed psychiatrist recognized under Barbados’s domestic law. B(iii) Set aside the death penalty 106. The Commission requested that the Court order the State to commute Mr. DaCosta Cadogan’s death sentence. It argued that Mr. DaCosta Cadogan “has no legal certainty that he will not face execution unless and until his sentence is formally commuted.” 107. The representatives initially requested “[a] direction that the State of Barbados commute the death sentence of the victim and substitute there[for] a sentence of life imprisonment with appropriate opportunity to apply for parole.” Alternatively, the representatives later requested that the victim “be afforded a full sentencing hearing, at which a judge determines the just and appropriate sentence after hearing oral representations from the […] victim.” They argued that if Mr. DaCosta Cadogan’s sentence of death is automatically substituted to a life sentence without the possibility of parole, he will again be subjected to a violation of his conventional and constitutional rights, given that such a sentence would “permi[t] no distinction to be drawn between one offen[s]e of murder and another[…], [no consideration of the] circumstances of the individual offender, [and] no opportunity to plead for a lesser penalty.” The representatives observed, additionally, that it is the “usual practice” in Barbados to substitute a sentence of life imprisonment when “it has been determined by the local courts that a condemned prisoner’s constitutional rights have been infringed in relation to the imposition or application of the sentence of death.” However, “[u]nder the laws of Barbados, a sentence of life imprisonment does not mean in practice that the prisoner will actually or […] invariably spend the rest of his life in prison. He is entitled under the Prison Rules to periodic reviews of his detention to determine whether he meets the test for release.” “The decision on release is, however, made by the Executive and not the Judiciary.” The representatives further argued that commutation of the death penalty through the Mercy Committee “would not afford the alleged victim a judicial determination of his sentence,” and would therefore not be an appropriate remedy. However, if the Court were not to accept this submission, the representatives maintained that the alleged victim must “at the very least be given the right to make representations” to the Mercy Committee.