from 2005 to 2015 provided as evidence in the instant case, which were consistent with the increase in the murder of women.64 36. The foregoing, allowed the Court to observe the contextual situation in Guatemala – in which the facts took place – in Veliz Franco et al., in order to compare this with the context of the instant case. This revealed that, in addition to showing a sustained increase in 2004 and 2005 (the year in which the facts of the instant case occurred), the escalation of homicidal violence against women has remained high up until 2015, with the result that the number of violent deaths of women increased by 20% more than the number of violent deaths of men between 1995 and 2004.65 The Court also underlined aspects of the context established in the previous case, such as the “exacerbation of the level of violence against women and the cruelty inflicted on the women’s bodies”;66 the “high levels of general impunity […] in relation to different types of crimes” including crimes against women, 67 and also the tendency of authorities and investigators to discredit and blame the victims for their lifestyle or clothing. 68 37. In this situation, it is admissible to consider that, at least since 2001 (as noted in the judgment in the case of Veliz Franco et al.), the State was aware of a context of an escalation of violence against women — including the phenomenon of “femicide”; a situation that should have resulted in State actions to take measures or create mechanisms that would have an impact on combating this context; irrespective of the measures taken prior to 2001.69 38. Thus, the Guatemalan State’s awareness of the context of an escalation of violence against women that went back to at least 2001, as revealed in the case of Veliz Franco et al. v. Guatemala, leads to the presumption that the State was or should have been aware of the phenomenon of femicide at the time of the facts that occurred in 2005, years after that case. 39. In this hypothesis, I consider that the context of which the State was already aware regarding the problem of gender violence in Guatemala is essential for understanding the analysis of the “first moment” of the obligation of prevention, also referred to in the judgment as the “general obligation to prevent the disappearance and murder of women” in Guatemala, as will be noted in the following section. III.2 The “two moments” of the obligation of prevention 40. To establish non-compliance with the obligation to prevent violations of the rights to life and personal integrity, the Court referred to the case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, to indicate the factors that must be verified as regards the obligation of prevention, which were the State’s awareness of the real and immediate risk for those rights, and the adoption of measures by the authorities to prevent or avoid that risk.70 Subsequently, the Inter-American Court repeated the criterion of the “two moments” of the obligation of prevention in the present judgment, indicating that this must be analyzed with regard to the “first moment” (before the disappearance Claudina Velásquez: general obligation to prevent Paras. 46 of the judgment. Paras. 45, 46 and 47 of the judgment. 66 I/A Court HR, Case of Veliz Franco et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations Judgment of May 19, 2014. Series C No. 277, paras. 78 and 48. 67 I/A Court HR, Case of Veliz Franco et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations Judgment of May 19, 2014. Series C No. 277, paras. 89 and 49. 68 I/A Court HR, Case of Veliz Franco et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations Judgment of May 19, 2014. Series C No. 277, paras. 90, 212 and 49. 69 I/A Court HR, Case of Veliz Franco et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations Judgment of May 19, 2014. Series C No. 277, para. 82. 70 Para. 109 of the judgment. 64 65 11 and costs. and costs. and costs. and costs.