CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE RHADYS ABREU BLONDET IN RELATION TO THE JUDGMENT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CASE OF ROSENDO CANTÚ ET AL. V. MÉXICO, OF AUGUST 31, 2010 1. I have decided to cast a concurring opinion regarding the Judgment in the case of Rosendo Cantu et al., based on the following: i) Mexico’s withdrawal of the preliminary objection regarding the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter called “the Inter-American Court,” “the Court” or “the Tribunal”) to hear the petitions submitted resulting from a violation to the Inter-American Convention for the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women (hereinafter, the “Convention Belen do Pará”) and, ii) the issue of why the Inter-American Court could have established the reparations that it denied in paragraphs 232, 235, and 238 of this Judgment. 2. Regarding the State’s withdrawal of its only preliminary objection. In the case of Rosendo Cantú et al., as well as in the case of Fernández Ortega et al., Mexico argued that the Inter-American Court lacked ratione materiae jurisdiction to hear the violations of the Convention of Belem do Pará, basically reproducing the argument it had offered before this Tribunal in the case of Gonzalez et al. (“Cotton Field”), which the InterAmerican Court discusses as of paragraph 33 of the aforesaid Judgment. Nonetheless, the State decides to withdraw said preliminary objection at a public hearing conducted for this purpose. 3. Mexico filed said preliminary objection in the case of Rosendo Cantu et al. on February 17, 2010 and in the case of Fernandez Ortega on December 13, 2009. Both dates are after this Court’s Judgment was issued in the case of Gonzalez et al. (Cotton Field), issued on November 16, 2009. Such procedural demeanor demonstrated dissatisfaction with the Court’s decision. It is does not seem strange to the InterAmerican system for the protection of human rights that States show resistance in complying with certain interpretations made by this Court of the American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter called “American Convention,” or “Pact of San Jose”). Such is the case with the continued crime criterion granted in cases of enforced disappearance of individuals, which generally impedes the States from alleging the Court’s lack of ratione temporis jurisdiction regarding probable violations of certain articles of the American Convention, such as the victim’s right to personal integrity (Article 5) or the right to judicial guarantees and to judicial protection to next of kin in search of the whereabouts of the victim (Articles 8 and 25), depending on the case. 4. Furthermore, the fact that a given State had “reconsidered” and then later withdrawn by itself a preliminary objection such as the mentioned, which inadmissibility had being exemplarily explained by this Court, must be then understood as a sample of the steadfastness that such jurisprudential criterion has acquired up to this time. Changing it, which would be clearly absurd, is now extremely hard to do. On why this Court could establish the reparations denied in paragraphs 232, 235, 5. and 238 of this Judgment. This Tribunal deemed that it was not conducive to rule on reparation measures requested by the Inter-American Commission regarding the: i) design of a policy that would guarantee indigenous women’s access to justice by means of respect to their cultural identity, ii) design and implementation of multidisciplinary health services for women who had been victims of rape, and iii) design of participatory programs which would contribute to the integration into the community of indigenous women who had been victims of rape. 6. A precedent set by the Inter-American Court whereby it was established that the necessary motivation and establishement of foundation of the intent of the reparations