37 because she could not ignore the likelihood that the violence suffered could be further increased by the State agents who witnessed the rape, owing to the possibility that they would also rape her. 116. In that sense, the expert witness Correa Gonzalez mentioned that Mrs. Rosendo Cantu felt powerless, an inability to react, and humiliation given the aggression and rape by the soldiers, feelings that were aggravated by the presence of the other soldiers during the rape. Likewise, she expressed that, at the time the event took place, she felt desperation and anguish. She indicated “seeing how she was left —beaten, without clothing, raped— […] was such a traumatic experience that she was unable to accept what had occurred.” In addition, in the days after the rape, she felt shame and physical and emotional powerlessness. Also, the expert referred to the psychological and psychosomatic effects as a consequence of the rape.127 iii) Purpose 117. The Court considers that, in general terms, as in the case of other acts of torture, rape has other objectives, including intimidating, degrading, humiliating, punishing, or controlling the person who is raped.128 The rape of Mrs. Rosendo Cantú occurred in the context of a situation in which the soldiers were questioning the victim and did not obtain a response to the information they required (supra para. 73). Without denying the possibility that there were also other objectives, the Court considers it proven that, in the present case, the rape had the specific purpose of punishing the victim because she failed to provide the required information. 118. On the other hand, the Court finds that rape may constitute torture even when it is based in a single fact alone and takes place outside State facilities.129 This is so because the objective and subjective elements that classify an act as torture do not refer either to the accumulation of facts or to the place where the act is committed, but to the intention, the severity of the suffering, and the purpose of the act, requisites that, in the present case, have been fulfilled. Based on the aforementioned, the Court concludes that the rape in the present case entailed a violation of the personal integrity of Mrs. Rosendo Cantú, constituting an act of torture pursuant to Article 5(2) of the American Convention and Article 2 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture. 119. Regarding the alleged violation of Article 11 of the American Convention based on the same facts, the Court has specified that, even though this provision is entitled “Right to Privacy” [entitled Protection of Honor and Dignity in Spanish], its contents include, among others, the protection of private life.130 Moreover, the concept of private life is a wide-ranging term, which cannot be defined exhaustively,131 but includes, among other protected forums, sexual life,132 and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings.133 The Court finds that the rape of Mrs. Rosendo Cantú violated 127 Cf. Statement rendered by expert witness Correa González before a public notary (case file on the merits, tome III, folios 1249, 1250, 1252, and 1254). 128 Cf. ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, supra note 121, para. 597, and CAT, Case V.L. v. Switzerland, Decision of 22 January 2007, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/37/D/262/2005, para. 8.10. 129 Cf. CAT, Case V.L. v. Switzerland, supra note 128, para. 8.10. 130 Cf. Case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia. Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of July 1, 2006, Series C No. 148, para. 193; Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panamá. Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of January 27, 2009. Series C No. 193, para. 55, and Case of Escher et al., supra note 115, para. 113. 131 Cf. ECHR, Case of Niemietz v. Germany, Judgment of 16 December 1992, App. No. 13710/88, para. 29, and Case of Peck v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 28 January 2003, App. No. 44647/98, para. 57. 132 Cf. ECHR, Case of Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 22 October 1981, App. No. 7525/76, para. 41, and ECHR, Case of X and Y v. the Netherlands, Judgment of 26 March 1985, App. No. 8978/80, para. 22. 133 Cf. ECHR, Case of Niemietz v. Germany, supra note 131, para. 29, and ECHR, Case of Peck v. United Kingdom, supra note 131, para. 57.