19 was not in violation of Article 9 of the Convention. The State noted that the IPOHA was not a new regulation, rather it was passed to implement Article 140 of the Constitution. Therefore, the Parliament only regulates the process for charging high-ranking officials. The State expressed that since Articles 278 and 386 of the Penal Code constitute substantive norms, “it must have been more than sufficiently clear to Mr. L.A. Alibux that he could be prosecuted for the criminal offences he committed.” Specifically, the State noted that Mr. Alibux did not provide an argument in regard to his lack of knowledge that his actions constituted punishable acts under the legislation in force at that time. He also did not express his lack of knowledge about the possibility of being prosecuted upon retirement. Moreover, the State argued that, in any case, the prohibition of non-retroactivity does not apply to a law that benefits the accused, and in this case the IPOHA benefits the accused since it requires that a request be made first to the National Assembly in regard to the prosecution of public officials. 57. The State also considered that, contrary to that which was noted by the Commission, Mr. Alibux was not the only high-ranking official that was prosecuted. In this sense, it made reference to the prosecution of two officials in 1977 and 2008 for crimes committed in the discharge of their official capacities. Therefore, it concluded that if the Commission had taken this fact into account, it would not have declared the violation of Article 9 of the Convention. Moreover, it reasoned that even if it were true that the IPOHA was adopted only with the purpose of allowing, for the first time, the prosecution of political office holders, said law does not bring about substantive criminal effects. The State added that faults in procedural regulations should not prevent high-ranking officials from being prosecuted. Given the aforementioned, the State concluded that there was not a violation of Article 9 of the Convention. B. Considerations of the Court 58. The Court notes that there is no dispute between the parties and the Commission regarding the procedural nature of the IPOHA upon regulating the procedure laid down in Article 140 of the Constitution, however, the Commission and the representative claim that it had substantive effects, and thus the legal dispute is in regard to whether the IPOHA violated the the right to freedom from ex post facto laws. In this regard, the Court will rule on a) the scope of the rule of freedom from ex post facto laws b) the temporal application of norms governing the procedure, and c) the application of the IPOHA in the case of Alibux, particularly if its implementation had substantive effects, that is, in regard to the offense or the severity of punishment. B.1 Scope of the Right to Freedom from Ex Post Facto Laws 59. Article 9 of the Convention establishes that: “[n]o one shall be convicted of any act or omission that did not constitute a criminal offense, under the applicable law, at the time it was committed. A heavier penalty shall not be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offense was committed. If subsequent to the commission of the offense the law provides for the imposition of a lighter punishment, the guilty person shall benefit therefrom.” 60. In this regard, the jurisprudence of the Court on the matter has held that the definition of an act as an unlawful act, and the determination of its legal effects must precede the conduct of the subject being regarded as a violator. Otherwise, individuals would not be able to orient their behavior according to a valid and true legal order within