perpetrator, which opens the door to authoritarianism precisely in a subject in which the juridical rights of greatest hierarchy are at stake.”146 86. Additionally, the Police Edict applied to Mr. Acosta Martínez sanctioned “being in a complete state of drunkenness in the streets, squares, cafes, cabarets, shops, taverns or other drinking establishments” with a fine and deprivation of liberty. That is to say, the provision in question punished the mere condition of being drunk, without reference to the conduct of the offender impacting or endangering themselves or others. In this regard, it should be noted that laws on misdemeanors, like criminal law, involve the exercise of the punitive power of the State, which is evident in this case since the sanction established is the deprivation of liberty. 87. In a democratic society, the State’s punitive power can only be exercised to the extent strictly necessary to protect fundamental legal rights from attacks that damage or endanger them. Drunkenness, as defined by the edict in question, does not by itself affect the rights of third parties, so sanction of it does not seek to protect individual or collective legal rights.147 Even if being drunk is considered in itself punishable, such behavior does not extend beyond the most private part of an individual’s life, which is without question a violation of the Convention, as it is specifically this area that is removed from the exercise of State ius puniendi, whose inviolable limit is the self-determination and dignity of the individual, constituting the basic pillars of all legal systems. 88. Notwithstanding the foregoing, under certain circumstances, the consumption of alcohol or other psychoactive substances can be sanctioned when it is associated with conduct that may affect the rights of third parties or endanger or injure individual or collective legal right. 89. Lastly, Article 2 of the Convention that States Parties to the Convention have a duty to adapt their domestic legislation to the obligations derived from the Convention. In this regard, the Court has indicated that: If the States, pursuant to Article 2 of the American Convention, have a positive obligation to adopt the legislative measures necessary to guarantee the exercise of the rights recognized in the Convention, it follows, then, that they also must refrain both from promulgating laws that disregard or impede the free exercise of these rights, and from suppressing or modifying the existing laws protecting them. These acts would likewise constitute a violation of Article 2 of the Convention.148 90. Therefore, upon using the Edict on Drunkenness and the Regulation of Procedures for Misdemeanor Offenses to arrest Mr. Acosta Martínez and having maintained this legislation following ratification of the Convention, the State violated articles 7(1) and 7(2), in relation to articles 1(1) and 2 of the Convention. B.2. Arbitrariness of detention Case of Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of June 20, 2005. Series C No. 126, para. 94, and Case of Rodríguez Revolorio et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 14, 2019. Series C No. 387, para. 63. 146 Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of May 2, 2008. Series C No. 177, para. 76, and Case of Usón Ramírez v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 20, 2009. Series C No. 207, para. 73. 147 Case of Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of June 21, 2002. Series C No. 94, para. 113, and Case of Rodríguez Revolorio et al. v. Guatemala, supra, para. 63. 148 29