32. The Court will now proceed to examine the said three preliminary objections filed by the State. A. “Lack of competence ratione temporis of the Court” Arguments of the parties 33. The State argued that “the facts that gave rise to criminal case No. C144/80 took place in 1980” and, in addition, the “facts that Mr. Grande argues to found his claim for compensation also predate the entry into force of the Convention for the Argentine Republic”; namely, September 5, 1984; “therefore, they are excluded from the Court’s consideration.” It also noted that, when accepting the Court’s jurisdiction, “it placed on record that the obligations assumed would only take effect with regard to facts that occurred following the ratification of the said instrument.” In support of its argument, the State cited Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and indicated that the Court had ruled in keeping with this article in the case of Cantos v. Argentina, taking into consideration the principle of the non-retroactivity of international law enshrined in the said convention and in international law in general. 34. For his part, the representative indicated that, “while it is true that the date on which the Argentine State accepted the jurisdiction of the Court was September 5, 1984, it is also true that the reported facts […] date back to July 28, 1980, and persisted until May 3, 1994.” In this regard, he argued that the State’s position sought to set aside the practice of the human rights protection organs, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, and the provisions of the American Declaration. The representative highlighted, in particular, that “the facts that the Commission presents as factual and legal conclusions are related to the criminal proceedings” after September 5, 1984, “and also to the remedy filed by Jorge Fernando Grande under administrative law, which lasted until [May 3,] 1994; in other words, almost 10 years after the Argentine State’s acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the InterAmerican Court.” Lastly, the representative indicated that, regarding “the facts that took place before the Court had jurisdiction, there is a causal relationship with the facts that occurred afterwards, so that the Court should examine all the facts.” 35. The Commission observed that “the violations it had asked the Court to declare in its application took place after September 5, 1984. Indeed, a significant part of the criminal proceeding to which Jorge Grande was subject took place between September 5, 1984, and January 24, 1989. However, the claim for damages, the result of which supports the [Commission’s] legal conclusions concerning the lack of judicial protection, was filed and heard in its entirety following the acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction.” The Commission stressed that, when “describing the factual framework of the application,” it had referred “to the background and all the criminal proceedings against Mr. Grande, insofar as this contextual information was relevant to the Court’s analysis of the facts that fall within its temporal competence.” Based on the above, the Commission asked the Court to reject this preliminary objection. Considerations of the Court 36. In order to determine if the Court is competent to hear a case or any aspect thereof, according to Article 62(1) of the American Convention,5 the Court must 5 Article 62(1) of the Convention establishes that “[a] State Party may, upon depositing its instrument of ratification or adherence to this Convention, or at any subsequent time, declare that it 8