12 guarantees,10 since it means that the accused does not have to prove that he has not committed the offense of which he is charged, because the onus probandi corresponds to his accuser,11 and it establishes that a person may not be sentenced and convicted unless his criminal responsibility has been fully proved. Furthermore, the Court has held that this principle is an essential element for the effective exercise of the right to defense and accompanies the accused during the processing of the proceedings until a final judgment determining his guilt has been delivered.12 In this regard, the presumption of innocence is violated if, before the accused is found guilty, a judicial decision concerning him indicates that he is guilty.13 34. As the Court has mentioned previously, the judgment in this case did not determine any individual criminal responsibility for the rape of the victim (supra para. 32), and State agents were not specifically individualized and identified. Consequently, the Court cannot be attributed with any violation of the presumption of innocence. Indeed, the Court has established clearly in its case law that the presumption of innocence corresponds to “any person accused of a crime,” 14 and it is not incumbent on the Court, under its competence as an international human rights court, to prosecute or convict individuals. What is striking about the State’s argument is that it suggests that the Court, in its task of determining the State’s international responsibility by verifying that the violations were the consequence of the acts of State agents, has violated the principles established in the Convention, the treaty that the Court applies and interprets, and compliance with which it monitors by means of its case law. Moreover, the Court ordered that the competent national authorities determine the individual criminal responsibilities, and it will be in the context of these investigations that the State must ensure compliance with the judicial guarantees referred to in its brief. d) Interpretation of “act committed by military personnel”–military jurisdiction 35. Lastly, in section “(a) Object of the interpretation” of the request for interpretation, Mexico asked the Court to confirm whether the reference to the “act committed by military personnel against Mrs. Fernández Ortega,” in paragraph 177 of the judgment, “is restricted to the assessment made by the Court […] regarding the intervention of the military justice system in the investigation into the facts and, 10 Cf. Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador. Merits. Judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of November 12, 1997. Series C No. 35, para. 77; Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez. v. Ecuador. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of November 21, 2007. Series C No. 170, para. 145, and Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 26, 2010 Series C No. 220, para. 182. 11 Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights of August 31, 2004. Series C No. 111, para. 154, and Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico, supra note 10, para. 182. 12 Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay, supra note 11, para. 154, and Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico, supra note 10, para. 183. 13 14 Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico, supra note 10, para. 184. Cf. Case of Bulacio v. Argentina. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of September 18, 2003. Series C No. 100, para. 129; Case of Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of November 17, 2009. Series C No. 206, paras. 119 to 121, and Case of Vélez Loor v. Panama. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of November 23, 2010 Series C No. 218, para. 205.