the objection that domestic remedies have not been exhausted must be raised during the first stages of the proceeding before the Commission; otherwise, it will be presumed that the interested State has tacitly waived its use. 4 Finally, as to the burden of proof applicable in the matter, the State that alleges non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must indicate which remedies should have been exhausted, as well as provide evidence of their effectiveness. 5 39. As indicated in supra paragraph 31, the Venezuelan State did not respond to this petition and, in this respect, tacitly waived the claim that domestic remedies had not been exhausted. In turn, the petitioners alleged that this case has had an unjustified delay in the criminal investigations and, as a result, the exhaustion of domestic remedies should not be required. 40. The Commission observes that the petitioners have described a series of facts of distinct nature and/or persons involved. As a result, an analysis of the exhaustion of domestic remedies needs to be carried out separately in accordance with the following structure: i) the facts surrounding the death of Néstor José Uzcátegui; ii) the alleged acts of aggression, death threats, and harassment against Luís Uzcátegui; and iii) the criminal proceedings for the aggravated defamation filed against Luís Uzcátegui. a. With respect to the facts surrounding the death of Néstor José Uzcátegui 41. As indicated by the Commission, in order to analyze compliance with the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies, the appropriate remedy to be exhausted must be determined in accordance with the circumstances of the case, this being understood to mean such a remedy that may restore the legal rights violated. 6 In cases of alleged arbitrary deprivations of the right to life, the appropriate remedy is the investigation and criminal proceeding filed and encouraged by the State, ex officio, to identify and punish the responsible parties. 7 42. With respect to the unjustified delay, the Commission evaluates the circumstances and conducts a case-by-case analysis to determine whether an undue delay occurred. As a general rule, the Commission determines that “a criminal investigation should be carried out promptly to protect the interests of the victims and to preserve evidence […].” 8To determine whether an investigation has been carried out “promptly,” the Commission takes into account a number of factors, such as the time passed since the crime was committed, whether the investigation has moved beyond the preliminary stage, the measures adopted by the authorities, and the complexity of the case. 9 43. With respect to the available information, even though a criminal investigation began as a consequence of the death of Néstor José Uzcátegui, domestic investigations have not yet gone 5; I/A Court H.R., Moiwana Community Case. Judgment of June 15, 2005. Series C No. 124, para. 49; and I/A Court H.R., Case of the Serrano Cruz Sisters. Preliminary Objections. Judgment of November 23, 2004. Series C No. 118, para. 135. 4 I/A Court H.R., Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community Case. Preliminary Objections. Judgment of February 1, 2000. Series C No. 66, para. 53; I/A Court H.R., Castillo Petruzzi et al. Case. Preliminary Objections. Judgment of September 4, 1998. Series C No. 41, para. 56; and I/A Court H.R., Loayza Tamayo Case. Preliminary Objections. Judgment of January 31, 1996. Series C No. 25, para. 40. The Commission and the Court have established that “[t]he first stages of the proceeding” should be understood as “the stage of admissibility of the procedure before the Commission, that is, before any consideration of the merits […].” See, for example, IACHR Report N° 71/05, Ever de Jesús Montero Mindiola, Petition 543/04, Admissibility, Colombia, October 13, 2005, that cites I/A Court H.R., Case of Herrera Ulloa. Judgment of July 2, 2004. Series C No. 107, para. 81. 5 IACHR Report N° 32/05, Luis Rolando Cuscul Pivaral and other persons affected by HIV/AIDS, Petition 642/03, Admissibility, Guatemala, March 7, 2005, paras. 33-35; I/A Court H.R., Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community Case. Preliminary Objections, supra note 3, para. 53; I/A Court H.R., Durand and Ugarte Case. Preliminary Objections. Judgment of May 28, 1999. Series C No. 50, para. 33; and I/A Court H.R., Cantoral Benavides Case. Preliminary Objections. Judgment of September 3, 1998. Series C No. 40, para. 31. 6 IACHR, Report No. 23/07. Eduardo José Landaeta Mejías, et al. Petition 435-2006, Admissibility, para. 43, March 9, 2007. 7 IACHR, Report No. 23/07, Eduardo José Landaeta Mejías, et al. Petition 435-2006, Admissibility, para.43, March 9, 2007; IACHR, Report No. 15/06, Maria Emilia González, Paula Micaela González and María Verónica Villar.Petition 61801, Admissibility, para. 34, March 2, 2006; IACHR, Report No. 52/97, Case 11.218, Arges Sequeira Mangas, 1997 Annual Report, para. 96 and 97.; See also: Report No. 55/97, para. 392 and Report No. 55/04 para.25. 8 IACHR, Report No. 16/02, Sevellón García c. Honduras, Petition 12.331, Admissibility, para. 31, February 27, 2002. 9 IACHR, Report No. 130/99, Víctor Manuel Oropeza, Petition 11.740, Mexico, paras. 30-32. 9