11 agreement’ that [the State] had forwarded” to the Court, because this agreement had been drawn up “outside the norms and practices of the Peruvian State.” Following this announcement, Peru requested the Court to “ignore the request that it deliver judgment contained in the invalidated document, because the latter was not legally valid”; this, despite the fact that, in the final plea of that document, it requested the Court to “declare that the [said] document was not legally valid.” 46. The State also undertook to “do its best to reach a friendly settlement agreement.” Should this agreement not be reached, it requested that the Court should rule on reparations (supra para. 32). 47. The Peruvian State, pursuant to Articles 7 and 8 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereinafter “Vienna Convention”), based the “invalidity” of this friendly settlement agreement on the fact that Mr. Salas Lozada, its agent at the time, lacked the “special powers” to sign it (supra paras. 30 and 32). Furthermore, Peru stated that this agent acted “before the supranational jurisdiction, outside the norms and practices of the Peruvian State,” since he “approved and signed the agreement […] without consulting and without the express approval of the Ministries involved.” 48. In its brief of January 7, 2005 (supra para. 32), the State also argued that some points of the “agreement on reparations and its appendix” violated the American Convention and provisions of domestic law, by infringing the principle of the presumption of innocence and assuming commitments that would entail “interference by the Executive Power and violation of the independence and autonomy of autonomous constitutional organs.” 49. In their brief of February 1, 2005 (supra para. 34), the representatives stated that, “[c]onvinced that they were dealing with an agent validly appointed by the State to represent it, […] they began and concluded the negotiation and signature of the agreement on reparations” (supra para. 28). Consequently, they “consider[ed] that [this] agreement [… was] valid.” They also stated that “the terms of the […] decision […] appointing Mr. Salas Lozada as the State’s agent in this case [(supra para. 18),] did not […] allow them to suppose that there was any defect or irregularity in the negotiation and signature of the agreement. Particularly, when the matter that [was being] agreed was the time limit and method of complying with the measures of reparation accepted by the State in its acquiescence brief [(supra para. 20)] and not a friendly settlement agreement on matters relating to merits, since these had been accepted by the State when it acquiesced” to the claims of the parties. Lastly, the representatives reiterated the importance of the Court giving a “detailed account of the facts” when delivering judgment. 50. In this regard, in its brief of February 14, 2005 (supra para. 36), the Commission considered that “it would not be pertinent for the organs of the interAmerican system for the protection of human rights to rule on the validity of the agreement on reparations under Peruvian law. The decision on this matter and the respective responsibilities should be taken by that State’s competent bodies; despite the fact that, at the international level, the presentation of the agreement to the Court may give rise to legal effects.” 51. The Court considers that, in these international proceedings, it should rule on the legal effects of the agreement, which the State claims is invalid. Given the contestation of this agreement, the Court will proceed to decide on the admissibility