61 126. The Court has considered that it has been proved that Mrs. De La Cruz Flores was incommunicado during the first month of her detention, and in continuous solitary confinement for the first year, and that the visits she could receive were extremely restricted (supra para. 73(55)). 127. This Court has already stated that “[i]nternational human rights law has established that incommunicado must be exceptional and its use during detention may constitute an act against human dignity,”111 since it may produce a situation of extreme psychological and moral suffering for the detainee.112 128. Similarly, as of its first judgments, the Inter-American Court has considered that “the prolonged isolation and compulsory incommunicado to which the victim is subjected represent, in themselves, forms of cruel and inhuman treatment, harmful to the psychological and moral integrity of the individual and of the right of all those detained to respect for their inherent dignity as human beings.”113 129. In this regard, the Court has indicated that: One of the reasons why incommunicado is conceived as an exceptional instrument is because of the grave effects it has on the person detained. Indeed, isolation from the exterior world produces moral and psychological suffering in the person detained, placing him in a particularly vulnerable situation and increasing the risk of aggression and abuse of power in prisons.114 130. The mere confirmation that the alleged victim was deprived of all communication with the external world for a month allows the Court to conclude that María Teresa De La Cruz Flores was subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. During her incommunicado, she was confined in unhealthy conditions and could not change her clothes for a month (supra para. 73(55)). Moreover, under article 20 of Decree Law No. 25,475, during the year she was in isolation, she could only go out into the exercise yard for 30 minutes a day, had very limited possibilities of reading, and had an extremely restricted visiting regime. All these facts denote that the treatment to which Mrs. De La Cruz Flores was subjected was cruel, inhuman and degrading. 131. Added to the above, in the instant case, it has been proved that Mrs. De La Cruz Flores suffered from various physical ailments during her detention, for which she received inadequate medical care (supra para. 73(54)); this does not satisfy the minimum material requirements of dignified treatment appropriate to her status as a human being, as established in Article 5 of the American Convention. 111 Cf. Case of Cantoral Benavides, supra note 29, para. 82. 112 Cf. Case of Maritza Urrutia, supra note 104, para. 87; Case of Bámaca Velásquez. Judgment of November 25, 2000. Series C No. 70, para. 150; and Case of Cantoral Benavides, supra note 29, para. 84. 113 Cf. Case of Maritza Urrutia, supra note 104, para. 87; Case of Bámaca Velásquez, supra note 112, para. 150; Case of Cantoral Benavides, supra note 29, para. 83; Case of Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales. Judgment of March 15, 1989. Series C No. 6, para. 149; Case of Godínez Cruz. Judgment of January 20, 1989. Series C No. 5, para. 164; and Case of Velásquez Rodríguez. Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, para. 156. 114 Case of Suárez Rosero, supra note 103, para. 90; and Cf. Case of Maritza Urrutia, supra note 104, para. 87; Case of Bámaca Velásquez, supra note 112, para. 150, and Case of Cantoral Benavides, supra note 29, para. 84.