jurisdiction ratione temporis.” In application of this criteria, the Court identified and individualized the victims in this case in Annexes II to VIII of the judgment. 17. Additionally, with regard to the alleged validity of the list attached to the 2007 Friendly Settlement Agreement, the Court recalls that, in paragraph 136 of the judgment, it expressly indicated that the said list did “not include all the victims declared in this judgment.” Based on the foregoing, the State is incorrect when it asserts that the Court had not taken into account the evidence it had provided or, in particular, the aforementioned consolidated list of victims attached to the 2007 Friendly Settlement Agreement. 18. The Court recalls the inadmissibility of using a request for interpretation to submit matters on which a decision has already been adopted, 7 and that such a request cannot be used as a means of contesting that decision. 8 Thus, the Court notes that, under the appearance of a request for interpretation, the State’s position revealed a discrepancy with what the Court had considered, decided and ordered, because it sought a modification of the victims determined in the judgment, a matter that lay outside the scope of Article 67 of the Convention. 19. Consequently, the Court considers that the State’s request is inappropriate. B. Request for interpretation filed by the representatives B.1. Arguments of the parties and of the Commission 20. The representatives noted that, in the thirteenth operative paragraph of the judgment, the Court ordered the State to ensure appropriate conditions to enable the persons who remained displaced to return to their original communities if they so wished. They indicated that concerns existed as regards what constituted the “original” location. Consequently, they asked the Court to establish “the necessary interpretation criteria to determine the place or places to which the victims may return and, in that way, ensure the correct implementation of the necessary measures to ensure appropriate conditions to enable the persons who remain displaced to return, if they so wish.” 21. In addition, regarding the measures of compensation, the representatives noted that, in certain circumstances, there could be some confusion between the payments that had been agreed in the past under the 2007 Friendly Settlement Agreement signed by the State and the representatives, and the compensation ordered by the Court in the judgment in question. First, they considered it essential that the Court clarify “whether the payments already made [to the person representing the family unit] will be deducted, in fairness, from all the members of the family unit or whether the deductions must first be assumed by the representative of the family unit and, subsequently, by the other members of the family.” Second, they indicated that some of the victims who had received a compensation payment as representatives of family units under the said Friendly Settlement Agreement were now deceased and, therefore, the Court should establish the criteria for how the deduction should be distributed among the survivors in each family unit. 7 Cf. Case of Loayza Tamayo v. Peru. Interpretation of the judgment on reparations and costs, supra footnote 3, para. 15, and Case of Vereda La Esperanza v. Colombia. Interpretation of the judgment on preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs, supra footnote 1, para. 26. Cf. Case of Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Interpretation of the judgment on reparations and costs, supra footnote 3, para. 16, and Case of Vereda La Esperanza v. Colombia. Interpretation of the judgment on preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs, supra footnote 1, para. 26. 8 5