36 the person to whom they were attributed and, consequently, the regularity of the proceedings under which the order would be issued. 131. In the instant case, it is also necessary to consider that the recourse of habeas corpus was presented against a threat of arrest, not with regard to an actual deprivation of liberty, and that it was finally resolved, before the arrest of Gustavo Cesti Hurtado occurred. This means that the whole cycle of the recourse procedure was completed before the proceedings initiated by the special military justice system had started to take practical effects on the situation of the said Gustavo Cesti Hurtado. 132. Besides, it should be indicated that the habeas corpus decision never deprived the military justice system of the possibility of insisting on its own competence, through the adequate legal channels, in order to duly resolve the dispute. 133. The Peruvian State violated the rights protected in Articles 7.6 and 25 of the Convention by not ensuring that the decision of the Public Law Chamber in favor of Gustavo Adolfo Cesti Hurtado was executed appropriately. X VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 7(1), (2) AND (3) 134. In its application, the Commission stated that Peru had violated Article 7(1), (2) and (3) of the Convention in relation to Gustavo Cesti Hurtado, because it had been shown that the victim “had been unduly deprived” of his liberty under the domestic proceeding. 135. The State declared that Gustavo Cesti Hurtado, who was deprived of his liberty under a judicial order, never presented a jurisdictional dispute, so that there was a statutory extension of the competence of the jurisdiction that judged him. Moreover, Peru stated that the victim did not request the benefit of provisional liberty and did not file a plea as to the jurisdiction of the court nor an appeal against the order of arrest. Therefore, according to the State, the order of arrest against Gustavo Cesti Hurtado continued with its “inherent defect” and, subsequently, after the first appeal in an ordinary criminal proceeding had been completed, the respective judgment was pronounced. 136. In its final arguments, the Commission stated that, although habeas corpus had been declared admissible, establishing that the competent jurisdiction was the ordinary jurisdiction, the proceeding before the military justice system continued and Gustavo Cesti Hurtado “was condemned and today is serving a four-year sentence, of which he has already served two long years. These are the consequences of having protested against the decision”. Moreover, the Commission declared that there is no doubt that habeas corpus is the appropriate means of resolving a violation of personal liberty and an illegal procedure. 137. It added that, as Gustavo Cesti Hurtado did not file a jurisdictional dispute, he remains in prison, since military justice refuses to apply de oficio an “uncontested jurisprudence” that “declares the competence of the ordinary jurisdiction when it is not a case of service-related crimes committed by members of the armed forces on active duty”. The requirement to have recourse to a jurisdictional dispute “would be an excessive, unreasonable obstacle to the exercise of the fundamental right, which is disproportionate and, therefore, not adapted to the intention and objective of the