20 municipal elections, but the State only gave them the same list of candidates for the RAAN that was presented when the case was being processed before the Commission. At that time, the representatives did not provide any other power of attorney or proxy. Subsequently, on February 17, 2005, the representatives forwarded the notarized testimony of the powers of attorney granted on February 14, 2005, by seven alleged victims. Finally, when presenting their final written arguments, the representatives provided the notarized testimonies of the powers of attorney granted by 79 alleged victims. 92. Consequently, the powers of attorney of most of the alleged victims were provided during the proceeding before the Court. The Court considers it would have been preferable to have had the powers of attorney when the proceeding before the Court commenced. Nevertheless, it considers that the reasons given by the representatives (supra para. 76) show the existence of problems preventing this, which the representatives explained to the Court and the Commission from the first moment in which they intervened autonomously in the proceedings. These difficulties are closely related to the number of alleged victims, their culture which is predominantly oral, the problems of access and transport to reach the different communities on the Atlantic Coast, and the lack of official documentation with the names of all those who were proposed as candidates (infra paras. 135 and 136). 93. Given some of the arguments put forward by the State (supra para. 74), the Court considers it should clarify that, even if CENIDH and CEJIL, the Commission or any of the representatives of YATAMA had manifested in writing that the first two organizations represented “all” the alleged victims, when the Court has referred to these organizations as “the representatives of the alleged victims,” it has done so in the understanding that they would represent those alleged victims who effectively granted them powers of attorney and that, while this did not happen, the Commission would be responsible for defending the interests of those who lacked representation. Likewise, the Court recognizes that, throughout the proceedings before the Court, CENIDH and CEJIL presented requests, arguments and evidence in favor of all the alleged victims, even though not all of them had appointed these organizations as their representatives. b) “[E]vident violations of the Nicaraguan Notarial Act in force” in the powers of attorney granted to CENIDH and CEJIL by some of the alleged victims 94. The Court has established that it is not essential that the powers of attorney granted by the alleged victims to their representatives in the proceedings before the Court should comply with the same formalities that regulate the domestic law of the defendant State.7 It has also stated that: The practice of this Court with regard to the rules of representation has been guided by [these rules]; hence the latitude the Court has allowed and applied without distinction […]. […] This latitude in accepting instruments granting representation is not without certain limits, however; limits dictated by the practical purpose that the representation itself is intended to serve. First, such instruments are to clearly identify the person granting the power of attorney and include an unambiguous statement of intent. They must also clearly 7 Cf. Case of Castillo Páez. Reparations (Art. 63(1) American Convention on Human Rights). Judgment of November 27, 1998. Series C No. 43, paras. 65 and 66; and Case of Loayza Tamayo. Reparations (Art. 63(1) American Convention on Human Rights). Judgment of November 27, 1998. Series C No. 42, paras. 97, 98 and 99.