III. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES A. The petitioners 6. The petitioners said that on August 11, 1994, the Legislative Assembly officially appointed Eduardo Benjamín Colindres to the position of regular judge (magistrado propietario) of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE). They said that in the wake of infighting in the Christian Democrat Party (PDC)— with which the alleged victim was connected, the Legislative Assembly, at the request of said party, removed Mr. Colindres from office on November 22, 1996. They said that Mr. Colindres’ dismissal was motivated by his actions on the TSE. They said that the Constitutional Division of the Supreme Court (hereinafter ���the Constitutional Division” or “the Division”), upon examining an application for constitutional relief (recurso de amparo) lodged with it, ruled that the Constitution contained no express procedure for the removal of a TSE judge; however, it held that it should be understood that since the Legislative Assembly was the body that evaluated the requirements for their appointment, then it was also empowered to remove them from office when they no longer met such requirements. The petitioners stated that said decision also specified, however, that such a procedure should respect the right to a hearing guaranteed in the Constitution. They said that the Constitutional Division ruled in favor of the application, finding that the alleged victim’s guarantee of a hearing and right to tenure had been infringed, and ordered that he be reinstated with back pay. 7. The petitioners said that shortly after Mr. Colindres’ reinstatement, PDC deputies requested the Plenary of the Legislature to set up a special committee to ensure the judge’s guarantee of a hearing. They said that the petitions filed by Judge Colindres against the creation of the special committee were denied by the Constitutional Division. They said that although, at first, the Constitutional Division ordered the suspension of the decision creating the aforesaid committee, that suspension led the Legislative Assembly to put pressure on the Supreme Court, which resulted in the ensuing unfavorable decisions. 8. They also said that, apart from having no basis in law to perform those functions, the special committee, by issuing a report from which it omitted information in its possession, failed to ensure Mr. Colindres’ right of defense. They said that on July 2, 1998, the Legislative Assembly adopted Decree 348 by which it removed Judge Colindres from office. 9. They said that Mr. Colindres filed two amparo applications against the decision to remove him, in which, inter alia, he questioned the authority of the Legislative Assembly to dismiss TSE judges and alleged violations of due process and of the principle of legality and that he had been tried twice on the same charges. However, those applications were declared inadmissible, and the actions of the Legislative Assembly and special committee were legitimized. 10. They said that in the suit for damages filed by Mr. Colindres as a result of his first dismissal, on December 23, 1999, the Supreme Court ruled against the State, and that the Civil Division upheld that decision on June 13, 2001. They said that the public prosecutor's office filed a cassation appeal, a decision on which was pending from August 2001 until December 2009, when the verdict went in favor of Mr. Colindres. The petitioners said that despite the existence of a final judgment, the State has refused to comply with it. 11. They said that the State is responsible for violation of the rights to a fair trial and judicial protection recognized at Articles 8, 9, and 25 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Articles 1(1) and 2 thereof, on account of acts that resulted in infringements of his due process guarantees, job tenure, the principle of a competent judge previously established by law, and the principle of legal certainty, given that, according to the petitioners, the judge was sentenced twice on the same charges. In particular, with respect to the principle of legality, they said that the Legislative Assembly did not have the authority to dismiss TSE judges and, therefore, Mr. Colindres' dismissal was illegal and arbitrary. Finally, they argued that as a result of the arbitrary nature of the proceeding the State violated the right of access to public service enshrined in Article 23 of the Convention. B. The State 2