8. Thus, with these references, the ICourtHR, without departing from its traditional position, appears to leave open the possibility that, in the future, it could be able to take a new approach to the matter, particularly when it affirms, in paragraph 85 of this judgment, that it: “has considered that the close relationship of indigenous peoples with their traditional lands and the natural resources linked to their culture that are found there, as well as the intangible elements resulting from them, must be safeguarded by Article 21 of the American Convention.” 16 9. Similarly, in paragraph 86 of this judgment, the ICourtHR reproduces what it has stated on other occasions, 17 that among the indigenous peoples: “There is a tradition in the communities with regard to a communal form of collective ownership of the land, in the sense that this does not belong to an individual, but rather to the group and its community. Because they exist, the indigenous peoples have the right to live freely on their own territories; the close relationships that the indigenous peoples maintain with the land must be recognized and understood as the essential basis of their culture, their spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic survival. For the indigenous communities, their relationship with the land is not merely a matter of possession and production, but rather a material and spiritual element that they must enjoy fully, even in order to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future generations.” 10. And, in paragraph 87 of this judgment, the ICourtHR adds that: “Moreover, the Court has indicated that the concepts of property and possession in indigenous communities can have a collective meaning, in the sense that possession is “not focused on individuals, but on the group and its community.” This concept of the ownership and possession of land does not necessarily correspond to the classic concept of property, but it deserves equal protection under Article 21 of the Convention. Failing to recognize the specific versions of the right to use and enjoyment of property that emanate from the culture, uses, customs and beliefs of each people would be equivalent to maintaining that there is only one way of using and enjoying property and this, in turn, would make the protection granted by Article 21 of the Convention meaningless for millions of individuals.” B. The case of Paraguay. 11. To understand the effects of the recently drafted paragraphs and supporting the thesis that the ICourtHR appears to be envisioning an approach that departs from the classic position held in this area, it should be recalled that, in this case, both the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights and the representatives of the victims repeatedly indicated that the rights they considered violated by Paraguay were the rights of both the Xákmok Kásek Community, and of its members, without the respondent State in this case, Paraguay (hereinafter the State), contesting the capacity of the Community as a collective subject of rights. 18 16 Article 21. “Right to Property 1. Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of society. 2. No one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the cases and according to the forms established by law. 3. Usury and any other form of exploitation of man by man shall be prohibited by law.” 17 Cf. Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, supra note 2, para. 149; Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, supra note 2, para. 118, and Case of the Saramaka People. v. Suriname. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 28, 2007. Series C No. 172, para. 90. 18 E.g.: Paragraph 2. 3