84 Peruvian security forces was evidence of a resistance to the transfer operative[, …] situation [that] authorized the gradual use of force.” These last statements were not presented by the Commission in its brief of final arguments, but when it referred to the ‘extra judicial killing of unarmed inmates,” the Commission stated in said arguments that “in cases like those of the Criminal Center Castro Castro […] it is proven that the use of fire weapons is not necessary and that[,] in any case, the motivation announced for the operation is not the real one.” 214. The common intervener stated that there was no rebellious movement to justify the use of force by the State, and that “[n]one of the evidence presented during the proceedings before the Commission proved that in effect ‘Operative Transfer 1’ Operative was a legal operative with the objective of transferring prisoners.” Likewise, the intervener indicated that “[t]he Commission […] assents to the version of the facts presented in a report issued by a Peruvian State body (the CVR),” and that said report “contradicts all that presented before the Commission itself (evidence never objected by the Peruvian state) y even more important, that in its fundamental aspects contradicts the conclusions of the Peruvian judicial body (National Terrorism Court) that investigated the facts regarding that occurred in Castro Castro issued a judgment in the first months of 2004.” Besides, the intervener made emphasis on the fact that “[i]f the objective had been a ‘necessary’ transfer of female prisoners to another prison ‘because said criminal center did not have any more capacity’, why did they keep taking prisoners precisely to said center up to the last week?” 215. It has not been proven before this Court that there was a riot when the first act of the “operative” was carried out, or any other situation that would require the legitimate use of force by State agents. On the contrary, the behavior observed by the security agents, high State authorities, and other State officials during the four days that the “operative” lasted, as well as after it, prove that it was an attack carried out to threaten the life and integrity of the inmates that were located in pavilions 1A and 4B of the Miguel Castro Castro Prison. 216. To reach the conclusion that there was no justifying cause for the legitimate use of force by state agents and that it was an attack carried out to threaten the life and integrity of the inmates located in pavilions 1A and 4B, the Court has taken into consideration, among others, the following actions and omissions in which the state authorities incurred at the time of the facts: • • • • the state authorities did not notify that they would carry out a transfer of the inmates on May 6, 1992 (supra para. 197(15)); the first act of the “operative” was extremely violent and there is no evidence that the state agents recurred to the measures that must be necessarily adopted prior to using force; that is, the first and only resource was the attack against the female inmates; as of the first act explosives were used to knock down the external wall of pavilion 1A (supra para. 197(20); as of the first day of the “operative” and during the three following days weapons that the experts have classified as for war or characteristic of a “military incursion” were used (supra paras. 186 and 187), such as instalazza type grenades, bombs, rockets, artillery helicopters, mortars, and tanks, similarly tear gas, vomiting, and paralyzing bombs were used against the inmates. The expert Peerwani, who is a forensic expert (supra para. 187), pointed out that