12 since, as is widely accepted, the contexts are fundamentally different, States cannot expect to have the same amount of discretion in the former as they have traditionally had in the latter. 49. A unilateral juridical act carried out in the context of purely interstate relations (e.g. recognition, promise, protest, renunciation) and independently selfconsummated, can hardly be compared with a unilateral juridical act carried out within the framework of treaty law, such as acceptance of an optional clause recognizing the binding jurisdiction of an international court. That acceptance is determined and shaped by the treaty itself and, in particular, through fulfillment of its object and purpose. 50. A State that recognized the binding jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court under Article 62(1) of the Convention, is thenceforth bound by the Convention as a whole (cf. supra 40 and 46). The goal of preserving the integrity of the treaty obligations is from Article 44(1) of the Vienna Convention, which is based on the principle that the denunciation (or “withdrawal” of recognition of a treaty’s mechanism) can only be vis-à-vis the treaty as a whole, unless the treaty provides or the Parties thereto agree otherwise. 51. The American Convention is very clear that denunciation is of “this Convention” (Article 78) as a whole, and not denunciation of or “release” from parts or clauses thereof, since that would undermine the integrity of the whole. Applying the criteria of the Vienna Convention (Article 56(1)), it does not appear to have been the Parties’ intention to allow this type of denunciation or release; nor can denunciation or release be inferred from the character of the American Convention as a human rights treaty. 52. Even supposing, for the sake of argument, that “release” was possible –a hypothetical that this Court rejects-, it could not take effect immediately. Article 56(2) of the Vienna Convention stipulates that a State Party must give “not less than 12 months’ notice” of its intention to denounce or withdraw from a treaty. This is to protect the interests of the other Parties to the treaty. The international obligation in question, even when undertaken by means of a unilateral declaration, is binding for the State. The latter is thenceforth “legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent with its declaration”, and the other States Parties are authorized to demand that that obligation be honored.7 53. Despite the fact that it is optional, the declaration of recognition of the contentious jurisdiction of an international tribunal, once made, does not give the State the authority to change its content and scope at will at some later date: “… The right of immediate termination of declarations with indefinite duration is far from established. It appears from the requirements of good faith that they should be treated, by analogy, according to the law of treaties, which requires a reasonable time for withdrawal from or termination of treaties that contain no provision regarding the duration of their validity.”8 Thus, in order for an optional clause to be 7. Nuclear Tests case (Australia vs. France), Judgment of 20 December 1974, ICJ Reports 1974, p 268, paragraph 46; Nuclear Tests case (New Zealand vs. France), Judgment of 20 December 1974, ICJ Reports 1974, pp. 473 and 267, paragraphs 49 and 43, respectively. 8. Cf. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of 26 November 1984, ICJ Reports 1984, p. 420, para. 63 and cf. p. 418, paragraphs 59 and 60.