that the Third Transitory Provision of Legislative Decree No. 673 was inapplicable; (ii) reinstated the right to receive the corresponding pension, equalized with the pensionable remuneration of active employees of the SUNAT public sector, and (iii) ordered the reimbursement of the increases that had not been received due to the application of the said Third Transitory Provision of Legislative Decree No. 673. 27. With regard to the State’s requests, the representatives indicated that it was necessary for the Court to clarify that the eighth operative paragraph of the judgment did have pecuniary effects because this would allow the 106 members of ANCEJUB-SUNAT who were not included in Annex No. 2 of the judgment to receive some type of reparation in their capacity as victims, as they had been deprived of the equalized pension to which they were legally entitled. Also, regarding the “list of other persons who, while not members of ANCEJUB are discharged or retired employees of SUNAT,” they indicated that the meaning of the judgment was clear as regards the obligation of the State to create a list identifying other persons who, while not members of ANCEJUB-SUNAT, were discharged or retired employees of SUNAT who were in situations similar to the victims in this case. Accordingly, they indicated that what the State was requesting of the Court constituted “a distorted version” of what the Social and Constitutional Law Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice had decided in its judgment of October 25, 1993. 28. Regarding the representatives’ request concerning the interpretation of the meaning of the phrase “any other information or document necessary to fully execute the judgment issued in their favor” in paragraph 226, the State argued that it was clear that the judgment referred to other judgments obtained in the domestic sphere by other members of ANCEJUB or other persons who, while not members of this association, were discharged or retired employees of SUNAT because such persons would not be beneficiaries of the judgment of November 21, 2019. Furthermore, the Peruvian State understood that, in order to benefit from the eighth operative paragraph, the SUNAT discharged or retired employees who had obtained an administrative decision, should abide by the Peruvian legal system, because such a decision could be subject to judicial review. Therefore, in this regard, the Peruvian State also considered that the Court should declare the representatives’ request for interpretation inadmissible. 29. The Commission observed that the representatives had referred to the scope of paragraph 226 in relation to the eighth operative paragraph of the Court’s judgment. The Commission agreed with the representatives’ request that the Court clarify who could register on the list created by the State. Also, regarding the State’s request, the Commission understood that the purpose of this list was to identify all those who, to date, had not received the payment of pension rights owing to the failure to execute an internal decision, and so that they could receive the corresponding payments. Consequently, the Commission considered that the list would have pecuniary effects because supposing otherwise would entail denying the inherent remedial nature of this mechanism. In addition, the Commission underlined that the list related to the representatives’ request concerning the number of victims in the judgment in order to determine who should be included on the said list. B.2 Considerations of the Court 30. The Court reiterates what it established in paragraphs 224 to 227 of the judgment and in the eighth operative paragraph: 224. In this case, the Court has ordered a measure of restitution based on the human rights violations declared in this judgment. However, the arguments of the Commission and the representatives reveal that other members of ANCEJUB-SUNAT may find themselves in similar situations to those examined in this case, given the possible 8