constitute a violation of the Convention, pursuant to Article 47(b), and whether the petition is “manifestly groundless” or “obviously out of order,” pursuant to subparagraph (c) of that article. The standard for assessing these extremes is different from that for deciding on the merits of the complaint. At the present stage, the IACHR must perform a prima facie evaluation that does not involve a prior judgment or advanced opinion on the merits. The Commission’s Regulations reflect this distinction between the evaluation that must be performed to declare a petition admissible and that required to determine whether the State was responsible, by establishing clearly differentiated stages for studying the admissibility and the merits of the case. 39. The petitioners state that the petition presents facts that, prima facie, characterize violations of their rights. They say that the legislation on which the dismissals were based violated their right of defense by preventing them not only from gaining access to important information from the evaluation process, but also firmly established that the results of that evaluation could not be appealed. They say that due to that legislation and to other actions taken by the Executive Branch to co-opt the judiciary, a climate of failure to provide legal protections and of legal uncertainty was created, preventing them from receiving a judicial remedy even though they had turned to the courts. The petitioners also say that the State’s attempts to provide reparations for some of the consequences of the violations did not in any way affect the Commission’s competence to continue processing the case. 40. The State argues that the situation originally denounced by the petitioners had changed substantially because several of the petitioners voluntarily accepted some of the benefits offered by the State as a means of providing reparations for the detrimental effects of the dismissals. The State argues therefore that the subject of the matter being studied by the Commission was now abstract. 41. The Commission considers that it should examine that argument, based on the information obtained by the parties and decisions by the Commission and the Inter-American Court on the matter. 42. The Commission bears in mind the doctrine of the Inter-American Court, begun in the case of the Gómez Paquiyauri Brothers v. Peru in which the Court stated that: the international responsibility of the State arises immediately with the internationally unlawful act attributed to it, even though it can only be enforced after the State has had an opportunity to make reparation for it by its own means. A possible subsequent reparation carried out under domestic law does not keep the Commission or the Court from taking cognizance of a case that has already been initiated under the American Convention. 17 43. Indeed, the violations of the American Convention alleged by the petitioners would have been committed starting in January 1996; however the petition was lodged with the Commission before the State issued the regulations it cites as the source of compensation for the petitioners. Consequently, the Commission can hear the matter in order to determine whether or not the State committed an internationally unlawful act and, if so, its international responsibility is enforceable based on if it had the opportunity to provide reparations for the damage and what measures it took in that regard. 17 I/A Court H.R., Case of the Gómez Paquiyauri Brothers. Judgment of July 8, 2004, para. 75. 9