requirements in the de facto surrender of M and the legal guardianship proceedings, which included the fact that the child had been surrendered by means of an administrative act, without the intervention of the competent judge (supra paras. 80 and 81), that the father had not consented to the surrender to guardianship, and that the conditions that allow such consent to be disregarded were not verified (supra paras. 82 to 84).77 b) Omission of evidence 87. Various officials indicated that when the judicial decision was issued awarding guardianship, the necessary probative measures had not been taken. In this regard, the Chamber’s judgment indicated that, when it received the case file, the measures it adopted were designed, among other objectives, “to remedy the production of evidence that had not been obtained at the appropriate time (and the evidence that, of necessity, must be obtained in this type of litigation)” (italics added). 88. Furthermore, that judgment also noted the flaws in the psychological report on which the first instance judge had based his guardianship decision, indicating, inter alia, that: “it does not appear that ties between the baby and the adopting mother had been observed, or between the baby and the adopting father, or that interviews were conducted with the adopting parents or the biological father.” 89. For his part, the Children’s Ombudsman who intervened before the Chamber also verified the omission of evidence in first instance and, citing articles 73 and 74 of provincial Law No. 8,490, indicated that it was necessary to rectify this omission. Accordingly, among other measures, he proposed “a social and environmental study of the father, [and] interview[s] by professionals of the Juvenile Court’s technical team […], together and separately, with the parents of the child and [with the] guardians.” Similarly, the Public Prosecution Service also noted that, in first instance, no study of any kind, whether psychological, social, environmental or any other, had been conducted concerning Mr. Fornerón. Even the minority vote of the Chamber noted that the possibility of delivering judgment “was delayed because the Chamber had to take essential measures to incorporate important probative material.” 90. In conclusion, the first instance decision granting the legal guardianship of M, not to her biological father, but to a couple who had “de facto guardianship,” was issued without the necessary evidence, as indicated by various officials, who all agreed that probative measures had been omitted in first instance. c) Stereotypes used as grounds for the guardianship decision 91. The first instance judge stated that “the biological parents of the child […] had not had a formal relationship for more than 12 months, […] but had merely had occasional meetings, and the child’s mother had been having at least one other relationship; I am stating this, not to judge the mother’s conduct, but to underscore that the fruit of this relationship […] was not the result of love or the desire to form a family.” In addition, he emphasized the existence of a dispute between the parents of M and “the absence of a biological family.” He stressed that Mr. Fornerón was aware of the pregnancy, at least during the two months before the birth and, nevertheless, “did not show any kind of interest 77 Only one member of the Superior Court of Justice “underline[d]” and endorsed the assertion of the Chamber judge in relation to the irregularity that, at the time of the court’s decision, a guardianship that was not in keeping with the provisions of the law had been exercised “de facto” for almost a year. However, this finding had no legal consequences (file of attachments to the answer, tome III, folio 3652). 27