judges from the Judiciary, and officials from the Public Defenders Service (Ministerio Publico de la Defensa) and the National Secretariat for Children, Adolescents and the Family, which had decided to draft a bill that would specifically prohibit the direct award of guardianship for the purpose of adoption. 128. In addition, the Stated indicated that it considered inadmissible any declaration suggesting that the facts of the case related to situations of the trafficking or sale of children, owing to the inexistence of evidence to prove this in the case. Nevertheless, it affirmed that the State was “directly aligned with the international trend that criminalizes such acts [by promoting] legislative measures to combat them.” Furthermore, it observed that there was some confusion concerning the sale, appropriation and trafficking of children. Thus, it mentioned that, under Argentine law, the illegal trafficking of persons is a migratory crime, while some governmental and non-governmental organizations “use the concept of child-trafficking when referring to the sale of children, as in the case of the events that gave rise to the representatives’ claim, and that, in no way, had the State […] acknowledged that this occurs systematically in [Argentina].” ii) Considerations of the Court 129. The Inter-American Court considered it desirable to clarify that although there are diverse and important indications, even pointed out by the domestic authorities (infra paras. 132 to 134), that support the possibility that M was surrendered by her mother in exchange for money, they are not sufficient for this Court to reach a conclusion in this regard. The absence of a criminal investigation played a fundamental role in the failure to determine what happened with the child. 130. This Court has stated on other occasions that “[u]nder international customary law, a customary norm stipulates that a State that has acceded to an international convention must introduce into its domestic law the necessary modifications to ensure the execution of the obligations it has assumed.” In the American Convention, this principle is contained in its Article 2, which establishes the general obligation of each State Party to adapt its internal law to the provisions of the Convention in order to guarantee the rights that it recognizes.97 131. The Inter-American Court has interpreted that the adaptation of domestic law to the parameters of the Convention entails the adoption of two types of measures, namely: (a) the elimination of the norms and practices of any nature that entail a violation of the guarantees established in the Convention or that disregard the rights recognized therein or impede their exercise, and (b) the enactment of laws and the implementation of practices leading to the effective observance of the said guarantees. The former is satisfied with the reform, repeal or annulment of the laws or practices that have those effects, as appropriate. The latter obliges the State to prevent the recurrence of human rights violations and, to this end, it must adopt all the necessary legal, administrative and other measure to avoid similar facts occurring in the future.98 At times the obligation to adopt provisions of domestic law has entailed the obligation of the State to criminalize certain conducts.99 97 Cf. Case of Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina. Reparations and costs. Judgment of August 28, 1998. Series C No. 39, para. 68, and Case of Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 12, 2008. Series C No. 186, para. 179. 98 Cf. Case of Salvador Chiriboga v. Ecuador, supra note 87, para. 122, and Case of Fontevecchia and D’Amico v. Argentina. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 29, 2011. Series C No. 238, para. 85. 99 Cf., for example, in relation to the forced disappearance of persons, Case of Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama supra note 97, para. 185, and Case of Anzualdo Castro v. Peru. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 22, 2009. Series C No. 202, paras. 66 and 165. 37