7. That is, I think that the wrong perception of a part of the Peruvian population of what a proceeding before the Inter-American Court is, lies in the fact that they believe that this is an international criminal court that determines individual criminal responsibilities, that it is a superior instance that knows of the same process carried out in the domestic law and, within it, not only acquits alleged terrorists, but also orders payment of a compensation in their favor. 8. I must point out, once again, that the Inter-American Court is a tribunal for the control of conventional legality, with regard to the acts or omissions of the States Parties to the American Convention, which are the only ones who can be declared internationally responsible for infractions to the Convention. It is a process different to the domestic one, in which the parties, the object, and the applicable legislation are different. In one domestic criminal law is applied and in the other international human rights law is applied, since one is carried out in the venue of a domestic or national criminal court and in the other a proceeding is carried out in the venue of an international court. 9. This results in the confusion between some people who are not experts in Law, those who assume that the Inter-American Court has erroneously determined criminal responsibility, which is obvious to them and that, as if this were not enough, orders the payment of a compensation to the alleged guilty parties. The public opinion must be clear, and it is the responsibility of the States Parties to the Convention to inform them, of the different nature of both processes. That is, they must make it clear that if the case reached the Inter-American Court it is because the State did not correct the violations through its own courts. 10. However, it is my understanding, that one thing is to request the interpretation of a judgment, whichever it is, and another is to expect that the forms of compliance of the judgment be defined through the interpretation, since this is a matter of the supervision of compliance of the judgment. Some of the State’s concerns could be the object of consideration of the Tribunal in this stage of the proceedings. In this sense, the Tribunal has stated: […] the Court considers that said argument does not constitute a matter regarding the sense and scope of the Judgment, but instead refers to the means the State must employ to comply with the Judgment. Since it does not correspond to a supposition of interpretation of the Judgment according to the applicable regulations, the mentioned argument must be declared inadmissible and, as soon as it is appropriate and convenient, it may be analyzed in the stage of supervision of compliance with the Judgment.3 11. The other possibility, that the Court had extended on its considerations on terrorism, which it has done in other judgments, will be considered in the next section. Case of Boyce et al., Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 20, 2007, Series C No. 169, footnote 37; Case of Zambrano Vélez et al., Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment of July 4, 2007, Series C No. 166, para. 93; and Case of Yvon Neptune, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment of May 6, 2008, Series C No. 180, para. 37. Case of the Dismissed Congressional Employees (Aguado Alfaro et al.) v. Peru. Request for Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 30, 2007. Series C No. 174. 3 3