308. The Commission has taken note that both the petitioners in their various communications and the UFI AMIA in its public access reports have coincidentally indicated that the documentary collections gathered or produced by the SIDE are made up of files of various formats, all of which were opportunely classified as secret, in accordance with the legal regime that regulates the functions and activities of the bodies that make up the Argentine national intelligence system282. 309. Likewise, the Commission has been informed of the existence of a series of decrees and official initiatives aimed at organizing, systematizing, transferring custody, and declassifying relevant information produced or stored by various State agencies and, in particular, documentation that was originated by the SIDE, or it remained or continues to remain in its power. 310. In this regard, the Commission reaffirms that it does not consider it necessary in the present case to refer to the decision of the States to involve the intelligence agencies and their officials as collaborators of the justice system in criminal investigations; however, as has been indicated, there are certain safeguards to consider by virtue of the evidence or conjectures that are intended to support. The Commission is also mindful of the need for a regime to classify the information in the possession of said bodies, in order to safeguard the personal integrity of the agents who participate in the information gathering operations and the protection of national security. 311. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission once again emphasizes that the States have the obligation to ensure that the normative regulation and day-to-day management of intelligence services is compatible with the fundamental principles of the rule of law and international human rights standards283. In particular, the Commission understands that the legitimate aim that the States may pursue by putting into operation a regime for the classification of intelligence activities does not imply a carte blanche for intelligence agencies to operate in total secrecy. 312. In this regard, the Commission considers that the need to resolve the conflict that arises between the need to maintain the secrecy of certain intelligence activities and the right of access to information is of utmost importance in those cases in which the Intelligence agencies are called to act as judicial auxiliaries in a criminal investigation related to serious human rights violations. The Commission considers that there are numerous reasons why the restriction on the right of access to information may be argued, even more when it is required by the parties who are constituted as plaintiffs in the judicial proceedings. 313. In this regard, the Inter-American Court has indicated that everyone, including the next of kin of victims of serious human rights violations, has the right to know the truth and to be informed of everything that happened in relation to said violations. Likewise, and from the point of view of the guarantees of due process generally enshrined in Article 8.1 of the Convention, in relation to Article 1.1, States have the obligation to guarantee the right of victims and their next of kin to participate in all stages of the judicial processes in order to enforce their rights. The Commission understands, in a general way, that the aforementioned rights are severely threatened when the judicial investigation consists, essentially, of documentary pieces that are classified as secret by reason of having been produced or collected by intelligence agencies. 314. It is therefore the responsibility of the IACHR to define whether in the present case the Argentine State complied with its international obligations derived from the petitioners' right of access to information, as a component of the right to know the truth about what happened. In particular, it is necessary for the IACHR to See in particular the account of the classification process as a secret of the document titled “AMIA Thematic. The International Connection. The Clarification of the Terrorist Attack and the identification of its Authors” presented by the SIDE to the UFI AMIA in January 2003 which appears in: Annex 20. UFI AMIA. The Process for declassifying confidential or secret information on the 1994 attack and its cover-up, p. 16 and 17. Annex 27 to the petitioners' communication dated November 11, 2019. 283 United Nations. Human Rights Council. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin. Compilation of good practices on legal and institutional frameworks for intelligence services and their oversight. A/HRC/14/46. May 17, 2010. Para. 12. Available at https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G10/134/10/PDF/G1013410.pdf?OpenElement 282 59