the friendly settlement process, the State continued to make progress on various issues that were on the work agenda, and they assured that in subsequent briefs, the petitioners were reiterated their willingness to resume a space for dialogue. Also, referring to both the attacks on the Israeli Embassy and the AMIA headquarters, they pointed out that: the political deficiencies and that of the police, security, intelligence services, and the judiciary, were left bare on March 17, 1992, which is inexcusable, and continued to be this way enabling that, two years after the first attack occurred, Buenos Aires was the target of a new attack. Under this pattern the first years of investigation, or lack thereof, were carried out under the responsibility of a federal judge without any experience or training in international terrorism, like the rest of his colleagues, a judiciary that was ancient in its technical and human resource structure, security and intelligence forces more concerned with covering up their own crimes and diverting the investigation rather than in providing evidence, and an executive branch that, in the best of cases, was not up to the task. 37. Additionally, the representatives of the State of Argentina added that: Clearly, the State mechanisms were not up to the task either in preventing the events, especially having had as a precedent the attack on the headquarters of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, nor in ensuring a judicial investigation that could provide an efficient response to the victims and society. This determined the recognition of responsibility through National Decree 812 of 2005. 38. At the same hearing, the State referred to the cover-up trial. In this regard, the representatives indicated that the oral trial began in August 2015 before the Federal Oral Criminal Court of Buenos Aires No. 2, which delivered its verdict in February 2019. They also indicated that in the first instance several convictions were issued, which account for a series of concealment maneuvers, of actions incompatible with the duties of public officials, and other crimes, they also indicated that the case was pending at the appeal stage. 39. On the other hand, the State indicated that a large part of the current efforts refer to collaborating and finding the necessary elements to advance in the processing of declassified information from the Intelligence Secretariat, the product of various decrees. Finally, the State also referred to the efforts made to recover files, indicating that currently 40% of the documentary material has been processed, and pending processing is audio and video documentary material found in the archive located in the Barolo building. Finally, they mentioned a number of legislative measures promoted for the benefit of the victims, as well as the trial in absentia and other international cooperation measures to advance the criminal process. 40. The Commission, as it did at the time of signing the agreement of March 4, 2005, expresses its approval for the acknowledgment of responsibility made by the Argentine State, since it represents a conducive measure to guarantee full validity of rights, in accordance with the principles that inspire the Inter-American Human Rights System4. The Commission also highlights that such recognition constitutes a step towards vindicating the rights of the victims of the attack and their next of kin. 41. Regarding the scope of this acknowledgment of responsibility, the Commission understands that the Argentine State explicitly and unequivocally accepted its responsibility for the breach of its duty to prevent the attack against the AMIA, which resulted in the death of 85 persons and injuries to at least another 151. Likewise, the Commission observes that the State acknowledged its responsibility for not having adequately and effectively investigated the facts, as there was a serious and deliberate breach of its investigative function. 42. The Commission notes that the representatives of the State, when referring to their acknowledgment of responsibility made in the last hearing, did not clearly and explicitly accept the responsibility of the State for those events that occurred after March 4, 2005, moment in which the aforementioned agreement was signed. Along these lines, the Commission understands that, although the State ruled on some events subsequent to 2005, they are not specific enough to understand the actions and omissions from which its international IACHR, Press Release No. 05/05. "Satisfaction of the IACHR with the acknowledgment of responsibility of the Argentine State in the AMIA case," March 4, 2005. Available at: https://www.oas.org/es/centro_noticias/comunicado_prensa.asp?sCodigo=CIDH-5-S 4 8