the First Specialized Subsidiary Chamber of the Court of Appeals, and, instead, the decision of the 23rd Judge was affirmed. 59 The judge found the remedy inadmissible, among other grounds, applying the presumption of flight provided for in Article 251 of the COPP. 60 It appears from the record that a motion for reconsideration was brought against that decision, which was denied on June 30, 2006. 46. t appears from the record that on August 14, 2006, a constitutional amparomotion was brought before the Supreme Court of Justice on the grounds that the rejection of the motion to modify the deprivation of liberty of Raúl José Díaz Peña by the 23rd Court of First Instance, on March 29, 2006, was in violation of several constitutional provisions. It was argued that the deprivation of liberty was implemented illegally; that the basis of the declaration of inadmissibility violated the presumption of innocence in respect of Mr. Díaz Peña by expressly characterizing him as responsible for committing the attacks of February 25, 2003 61; the procedural delays have not been imputable to Mr. Díaz Peña, as these were due to the recusals, rotations, and removal of judges; and that the prosecutors and judges in charge of the criminal proceeding and of the requests for review and substitution of the measure ordering deprivation of liberty were neither independent nor impartial. 47. The amparo action was found inadmissible on February 26, 2007, by the First Specialized Subsidiary Chamber of the Court of Appeals of the Criminal Judicial Circuit for the Metropolitan Area of Caracas, and its inadmissibility was affirmed in an appeal of May 11, 2007, by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, which based its decision on the possibility of the defense of Mr. Díaz Peña being able to file, as in effect it did, a motion of appeal against the refusal to review the deprivation of liberty, thus on having opted to bring regular challenges provided for in the legal order, the amparo is inadmissible. From the record it appears that the decision in the amparo case, in the first instance and on appeal, failed to refer to the arguments in Mr. Díaz Peña’s defense regarding the illegal deprivation of liberty, the illegality of the evidence collected, or and the existence of procedural delay not imputable to Mr. Díaz Peña. 48. As appears from the record, Raúl José Díaz Peña’s defense filed at least seven motions for review of the preventive detention measure, as per Article 264 of the COPP, all of which were rejected. In addition, on April 22, 2004, Raúl José Díaz Peña’s defense filed a motion for nullity, among others, for failure to comply with the forms and conditions established in the law, and to nullify the expert report offered by the Public Ministry, which was denied. 49. With respect to the conditions of detention, the Commission observes that from the record it appears that the defense of Mr. Díaz Peña has taken several initiatives before the prison authorities and before the judges with jurisdiction, to request medical care for the alleged victim and to seek his transfer to another prison, considering the health 62 of Raúl José Díaz Peña. 50. The Commission considers, therefore, that the requirements of Article 46(1)(a) of the American Convention have been satisfied as regards the preventive detention and the conditions of detention with respect to the alleged violation of Articles 5, 7, 8, and 25. 59 The petitioner cites the First Specialized Subsidiary Chamber of the Court of Appeals of the Criminal Judicial Circuit for the Metropolitan Area of Caracas to hear Cases of Terrorism-related Crimes, writing for the Court Judge Maikel José Moreno, Resolution of the Motion of Appeal, June 19, 2006. Attached to the petitioner’s brief of June 13, 2006. 60 The petitioner cites the First Specialized Subsidiary Chamber of the Court of Appeals of the Criminal Judicial Circuit for the Metropolitan Area of Caracas to hear Cases of Terrorism-related Crimes, writing for the Court Judge Maikel José Moreno, Resolution of Motion of Appeal, June 19, 2006. Attached to the petitioner’s brief of June 13, 2006. 61 The finding of inadmissibility states in part: “… the Public Ministry, according to its investigations, was able to verify that citizen Raúl José Díaz Peña participated in the planning of the [attack against the Consulate of Colombia and the Embassy of Spain],” which constitutes an act of terrorism. First Specialized Subsidiary Chamber of the Court of Appeals of the Criminal Judicial Circuit for the Metropolitan Area of Caracas to hear cases of Terrorism-related Crimes, writing for the Court Judge Maikel José Moreno, Resolution of Motion to) Appeal, June 19, 2006. Attached to the petitioner’s brief of June 13, 2006. 62 The motions filed November 15, 2006, and June 8, 2007, are in the record. 13