throughout the proceeding numerous motions for review and for replacement of the detention measure have been filed which have been denied based on the presumption of flight. 24 14. The petitioner alleges that on March 24, 2006, as two years had elapsed from the time the alleged victim was detained, a motion for review of the measure of detention was filed, pursuant to Article 244 of the COPP 25, and that on March 29, 2006, the 23rd Court denied the review of the detention measure. 26 She noted that a motion of appeal of that decision was filed, which was rejected on June 19, 2006, by the First Specialized Subsidiary Chamber of the Court of Appeals, and, in its place, the decision of the 23rd Judge was affirmed. 27 She notes that among the bases for the rejection, the judge reported that “while it is true that more than two years have elapsed … the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice handed down a decision … which reliably establishes that all those crimes against humanity, punishable violations of human rights, and war crimes are excluded from benefits such as substitute precautionary measures, in the event that the judge considers that there is a foundation for the deprivation of liberty of the accused.” 28 She also alleges that the judge, in applying the presumption of flight in Article 251 of the COPP, indicated that “… the Public Ministry, based on its investigations, was able to verify that citizen Raúl José Díaz Peña participated in planning the [attack against the Consulate of Colombia and the Embassy of Spain]”, which constitutes an act of terrorism. 29 The petitioner alleges that the reasoning used by the judge violates the principle of the presumption of innocence. She also notes that a motion for reconsideration was filed against that decision, and denied on June 30, 2006. 15. The petitioner argues that on August 14, 2006, a constitutional amparo action was filed on the grounds that the determination that the appeal of the refusal to review the order to deprive Raúl José Díaz Peña of liberty was inadmissible, handed down by the 23rd Court of First Instance on March 29, 2006, violates the rights to personal liberty, due process, presumption of innocence, and re-establishment of the legal situation harmed by judicial error provided for by the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. 30 She notes that the amparo action alleged, among other grounds, the existence of a procedural delay not attributable to Mr. Díaz Peña, the conditions in which his deprivation of liberty was carried out, the lack of sufficient 24 The petitioner cites the 28th Court of First Instance (for Review) of the Criminal Judicial Circuit for the Metropolitan Area of Caracas, resolution of December 20, 2004. 22nd Court of First Instance of the Criminal Judicial Circuit for the Metropolitan Area of Caracas, resolution of July 8, 2005. Attached to the original petition received at the IACHR October 12, 2005. She also cites the Fourth Court of First Instance for Criminal Matters (for Review) of the Criminal Judicial Circuit for the Metropolitan Area of Caracas, resolution of April 23, 2007. Attached to the petitioner’s brief received at the Commission on May 7, 2007. 25 The petitioner makes reference to Article 244 of the Organic Code of Criminal Procedure, Gaceta Oficial No. 5,558 of November 14, 2001: “Proportionality. No personal measure of coercion may be ordered when it is disproportionate in relation to the seriousness of the crime, the circumstances in which it was committed, and the likely sanction. In no case may the minimum penalty provided for each crime be exceeded, nor may it be greater than two years. On an exceptional basis, the Public Ministry or complainant may ask the judge overseeing the matter on review for an extension, which may not exceed the minimum penalty provided for the crime….” 26 The petitioner cites the 23rd Court of First Instance (on Review) of the Criminal Judicial Circuit for the Metropolitan Area of Caracas, Pronouncement on the Motion to Review the Replacement Precautionary Measure, March 29, 2006, which determined that “it is apparent that the procedural delay is not imputable to this court and it is also apparent that the two-year period, for granting a less cumbersome measure, has not elapsed.” Attached to the petitioner’s brief of June 13, 2006. 27 The petitioner cites the First Specialized Subsidiary Chamber of the Court of Appeals of the Criminal Judicial Circuit for the Metropolitan Area of Caracas for hearing Cases of Terrorism-related Crimes, Judge writing for the Court Maikel José Moreno, Resolution of Motion of Appeal, June 19, 2006. Attached to the petitioner’s brief of June 13, 2006. The petitioner submitted press information that notes the existence of complaints for corruption against Judge Maikel Moreno and his alleged ties to the so-called “Gang of Dwarfs” (“Banda Los Enanos”). Attached to the petitioner’s brief of June 13, 2006. 28 The petitioner cites the First Specialized Subsidiary Chamber of the Court of Appeals of the Criminal Judicial Circuit for the Metropolitan Area of Caracas to hear Cases of Terrorism-related Crimes, writing for the Court Judge Maikel José Moreno, Resolution of Motion of Appeal, June 19, 2006. Attached to the petitioner’s brief of June 13, 2006. 29 The petitioner cites the First Specialized Subsidiary Chamber of the Court of Appeals of the Criminal Judicial Circuit for the Metropolitan Area of Caracas to hear Cases of Terrorism-related Crimes writing for the Court Judge Maikel José Moreno, Resolution of Motion of Appeal. June 19, 2006. Attached to the petitioner’s brief of June 13, 2006. 30 Articles 44, 49(1), (2), (3), (4), and (8), and 257. 5