as helpful evidence. This measure must be complied with within one year of notification of this judgment at the latest. 24. Indeed, as can be inferred from paragraph 66 of the judgment, in application of the decision of July 26, 2005 of the Judicial Disciplinary Chamber of the Bolívar Sectional Judicial Council, Mrs. Martínez Esquivia was reinstated to her post. However, through an order dated September 7, 2005, the Judicial Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Judicial Council revoked this amparo ruling. According to the State, Mrs. Martínez Esquivia was reinstated in her position from August 2, 2015 to October 15, 2015, although the representatives rectified these dates to the effect that the reinstatement occurred between August 2, 2005 and October 15, 2005. 25. Consequently, the Court deems it appropriate to clarify that the State must pay the contributions to Mrs. Yenina Esther Martínez Esquivia's pension fund from the time of her dismissal until March 16, 2017, discounting the days when payment was made while she was discharging her post from August 2 to October 15, 2005. B. The need to adapt domestic provisions to guarantee the stability of provisional prosecutors B.1. Arguments of the parties and the Commission 26. The State requested an interpretation of operative paragraph nine of the judgment, by which the State was ordered to adapt “its laws in order to guarantee the stability of provisional prosecutors.” He argued that, under article 125 of the Constitution and article 23 of Law 909 of 2004, provisional employment is a temporary way of being hired for an administrative job. It added that article 96 of Executive Order 020 of 2014 clearly establishes the grounds for removal from service of those who perform administrative jobs, which are applicable to provisional prosecutors. Therefore, it considered that the Colombian legal system contained specific provisions that regulate the dismissal of provisional prosecutors and argued that "it is not clear why the Court finds it necessary for the State to adapt its laws." 27. The Commission pointed out that the State had already argued that it had sufficient, Convention-based regulations governing the work of provisional prosecutors; it believed, therefore, that the real intent of the State's request was to question the meaning of the Court's decision, and that it should be dismissed. 28. The representatives asked for the State's request to be rejected, considering that it "is not a request for interpretation, but rather a request to review operative paragraph nine, as an inappropriate means to have it eliminated.” They added that if the State wished to allege and prove that its legal system was compatible with the Court’s ruling, it should do so in the stage of monitoring compliance with the judgment. B.2. Considerations of the Court 29. The Court’s judgment held as follows regarding guarantees of non-repetition: 161. The Court notes that, in addition to the general constitutional provisions on the nature of the Prosecutor General’s Office and of public employment, the current organization and employment regime of the Prosecutor General’s Office are regulated by the Statutory Law on the Administration of Justice (Law No. 270 of 1996), the Organic Statute of the Prosecutor General’s Office (Law No. 938 of 2004), and the Decree Law classifying employments and defining the special career regime of the 6