10 in prison, suspended, and to disqualify him from driving any vehicle for eight years. (Articles 2611 and 84 of the Criminal Code) (…).12 34. The preamble of the Chamber’s verdict analyzes its discrepancy with the first instance verdict, based on an analysis of witness testimonies and Mr. Mohamed’s lack of prudence in the facts: (…) I must state here that I endorse the sentence appealed only in that it has proved the defendant’s striking the victim in this incident and that it caused her death. I do not share the trial judge’s disqualification of the testimony of the eyewitness to the accident (…) nor do I consider that testimony sufficient to substantiate whether the defendant in this case did or did not commit an imprudent action that at least contributed to the socially improper outcome. To assess blame, the trial judge focused exclusively on whether the defendant or the victim had the green light, as if that municipal authorization could absolve the defendant of all responsibility and obviate the need for determining what actually was the conduct that violated the objective duty of care when Mohamed failed to observe the law that prohibits passing another vehicle at an intersection, precisely to ensure that drivers have the necessary visibility at all times and be in control of their action. (…)The defendant’s own statements are sufficient evidence of imprudent action that was the decisive cause of the reproachable outcome being analyzed. Mohamed (…) said he stopped his bus at the bus stop on Belgrano, between Tacuarí and Piedras, behind a bus of line 103, so that when the defendant started up he changed lanes, because the bus of line 103 was in the lane to his right and passed halfway by him when they arrived at the intersection of Belgrano and Piedras, where the light was green; he saw the 103 bus brake and he saw a woman running in front of him, so he also braked, but he struck her with his bumper, making her stumble, fall, and strike her head on the ground. (…) I think that this account suffices to demonstrate the defendant’s lack of prudence in driving the vehicle for which he was responsible. Norms for care, as objective prevention regulations, are not available for private parties, nor abrogable for lack of use. Among the internationally accepted norms that apply to this case is the duty of one who creates a risk for third parties to act with full control of that risk at all times, in order to prevent any damage to others, which could result from possible and foreseeable circumstances; a related obligation is for one who passes another vehicle to maintain sufficient visibility, not to start passing at an intersection, curve, bridge, or other dangerous place; and a third duty is to yield to pedestrians in the crosswalk, at all times in areas where there are no traffic lights, and as indicated where there are traffic lights. In our legislation, these principles are contained in Articles 37, 39, and 40 of Decree Law No. 692/92, which regulates automobile traffic. (…) This established, we see that Mohamed, failing to exercise reasonable care to guarantee third party assets, started up his bus to pass to the left of another bus, so that when he was behind he voluntarily deprived himself of any possibility of preventing collision with the pedestrian still crossing the crosswalk, unlike the bus of line 103, which by maintaining the necessary field of view from his placement avoided a collision. This suffices to demonstrate the criminal liability of the conduct. But there is more (…). [Witness testimony is reasonable and indicates] that the victim started crossing with the 11 Art. 26.- In cases of a first sentence to prison that does not exceed three years, courts shall have the authority to suspend the sentence in the same ruling (…) There shall not be conditional sentencing for penalties of fines or disqualification. 012 Petitioners’ note of April 1, 1996. Annex, Judgment on the appeal handed down by the First Chamber of the Chamber of Appeals for Criminal and Correctional Matters on February 22, 1995. The State’s note of May 19, 1997, presents the same copy of the judgment.