11 red light about to change, arriving at the intersection and passing the other bus, and the defendant anticipating the yellow light, which explains why the other driver could brake and avoid colliding with the victim, unlike the defendant’s vehicle. This shows not only the obstructed vision described by the defendant, but also a certain unwarranted speed of his bus to reach the corner and pass the other bus, which is not idle speculation because the fracture of the left clavicle and the fracture of all the ribs on the left side— the side on which the victim was hit—and the fracture of the second and seventh ribs on the right side and the open wound in the right occipital 9…0 region obviously could not have been caused by a simple touch of the front bumper, especially when, as Mohamed claims, he was only going 10 km/h and applied his brakes before the “touch.” For all the foregoing I do not agree that in a case like this one the defendant’s guilt is in doubt because the testimony of the only witness who spoke of a green light for the victim was discarded. This does not mean that the green light would legitimize the previous imprudence of the defendant. And I do not agree with the conclusion that the evidence has not been able to discard the defendant’s version, which as I have just shown, is virtually a confession of imprudent conduct, even more reprehensible for someone like the defendant who, as a professionally licensed bus driver, had a greater responsibility to avoid risks to third parties and preserve others’ property, a responsibility that must be exercised with the utmost caution, prudence, and reason. (…) As a corollary, I feel that Mohamed’s characteristic, illegal, and punishable conduct, without mitigating grounds of justification, non-prosecution, inculpability, or impunity, must be sanctioned with a penalty (…). I propose that points I and II of the verdict be revoked and be applied to the defendant, as author of the crime of negligent homicide (…)13 35. Mr. Mohamed filed a special appeal against this sentence with the First Chamber of the Appeals Chamber.14 On July 4, 1995, the court ruled, rejecting the appeal in the following terms and ordering the appellant to pay costs: The arguments with which Mohamed’s counsel seeks to introduce the federal question refer to matters of fact, evidence, and common law that were weighed and debated at the time of the challenged judgment, and that verdict has sufficient grounds so as not be considered arbitrary. This doctrine does not seek to make the Supreme Court a third regular instance, nor to correct erroneous or allegedly erroneous decisions, but to address exceptional cases in which a total lack of law prevents regarding the decision of trial judges as a sentence based on law, as prescribed in Articles 17 and 18 of the federal Constitution. (…) Although the court has made a material error in citing traffic regulatory decree 692/92, which was not in force at the time of the facts, the conviction of the defendant is based on his violation of the objective duty of care, a circumstance that is duly demonstrated in the proceedings, and as noted above, is not a subject for discussion by this means (…).15 36. Mr. Mohamed filed a complaint motion (recurso de queja) with the Supreme Court to challenge this resolution.16 On September 19, 1995, the Court resolved the following: “Whereas: The special appeal, whose denial gave rise to this complaint, is inadmissible (Art. 280 113 Petitioners’ note of April 1, 1996. Annex, Judgment on the appeal handed down by the First Chamber of the Chamber of Appeals for Criminal and Correctional Matters on February 22, 1995. The State’s note of May 19, 1997, presents the same copy of the judgment. 214 Petitioners’ note of April 1, 1996. 315 Petitioners’ note of April 1, 1996. Annex, Judgment on the special appeal handed down by the First Chamber of the Chamber of Appeals for Criminal and Correctional Matters on July 4, 1995. 416 Petitioners’ note of April 1, 1996.