10 48. On November 12, 2003, Juan O. Sanjur sent two e-mails in which he referred to compliance with the judgment delivered by the Court on February 2, 2001, and submitted his comments on the State’s report of July 30, 2003, (supra para. 41 and infra para. 57). 49. On November 13, 2003, the Inter-American Commission presented its comments on the State’s report of July 30, 2003, (supra para. 41 and infra para. 55). 50. On November 13, 2003, CEJIL submitted its comments on the State’s report of July 30, 2003, (supra para. 41 and infra para. 56). 51. On November 19, 2003, the Secretariat, on the instructions of the President, forwarded a communication to the Inter-American Commission requesting it to submit, by November 21, 2003, at the latest, certain information needed for the Court to consider compliance with the provisions of the ninth operative paragraph of the judgment of February 2, 2001, and the eighth operative paragraph of the Order of November 22, 2002 (supra paras. 3 and 21). 52. On November 21, 2003, the Inter-American Commission forwarded a brief in response to the said request, in which it submitted information on the reimbursement of expenses and costs that was supposed to be carried out through the Commission. II COMPETENCE OF THE COURT TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS DECISIONS: ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES 53. In a brief of February 27, 2003 (supra para. 26), the State referred to the decision of the Court in the Order of November 22, 2002, on compliance with judgment (supra para. 21). In this brief, Panama stated, inter alia, that the stage of monitoring compliance with judgment is a “post-judgment” stage that “is not included in the norms that regulate the jurisdiction and procedure of the Court,” and that, in the said Order, the Court interpreted its own judgment of February 2, 2001. 54. On July 30, 2003 (supra para. 41), the State forwarded a brief with “[o]bservations […] on the Order of June 6, 2003, […] and information on the process of implementation of the judgment of February 2, 200[1],” delivered by the Court in the instant case. The following is a summary of Panama’s objections to the competence of the Court to monitor compliance with its judgments: a) The stage of monitoring compliance with judgment is a “postjudgment” stage, [...] that does not fall within the judicial sphere of the Court, but strictly within the political sphere, which, in this case [is] exclusive to the General Assembly of the Organization of American States.” “It is precisely owing to its recognized political rather than judicial nature, that this post-judgment stage has never been included in the norms that regulate the jurisdiction and procedure of the international courts”; b) The American Convention and the Statute of the Court establish clearly the limits of the jurisdiction and competence of the Court. Article 65