25. The representatives indicated that the period of prescription of 35 years for the crime of forced disappearance included in the proposed reform “does not meet standards set forth by the [Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons].” They affirmed that “if the reform is approved as the Federal Executive Branch proposes, the State of Mexico [will continue] infringing Article 2 of the American Convention.” 26. The Commission stated that it valued "the legislative initiative of the State and consider[ed] that it [was] a step forward in the process of achieving compliance." In particular, it considered that the inclusion of elements such the refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or to give information on the disappeared person that distinguish this crime from other crimes often related to the forced disappearance of persons, as well as the prohibition of privileges in its prosecution, to be “positive aspects” of the initiative. However, it indicated that the proposed reform still fails to conform “integrally with the standards established [in the J]udgment and those established in the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons.” The Commission indicated that “the definition of the perpetrator of the crime should be broad so as to ensure the punishment of all “principals, accomplices, and accessories to the crime, regardless of whether they are State agents or persons or groups that act with the authorization, support, or acquiescence of the State.” Additionally, it stated that “the standards of application of the quantum of the sentence are based on the perpetrator's status as a ‘public servant’ or a ‘private individual,’ which is incompatible with Article III of the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, which establishes the possible mitigating factors that could apply in cases of forced disappearance.” Last, the Commission manifested its concern that “a period of prescription be provided for this crime despite the fact that the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons establishes the imprescriptibility of that crime as a general rule.” In any case, the State “did not specify whether the established period of prescription of 35 years is compatible with the exceptions established by the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons in Article VII therein.” 27. The Court observes that the State has begun to adopt measures for the purpose of reforming Article 215A of the Federal Criminal Code that defines the crime of forced disappearance of persons. In order to analyze whether the proposed reform presented by the State adheres to the standards set out by the Court, it is necessary to specify that in its Judgment, the Tribunal only referred to two elements of that article that were incompatible with the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons. First, the Court indicated that this law limited the possible perpetrator of the crime of forced disappearance of persons to “public servants,” while Article II of the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons establishes that States must ensure that all “those persons who commit or attempt to commit the crime of forced disappearance of persons and their accomplices and accessories” receive punishment, whether they are State agents or “persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support, or acquiescence of the State.”17 Furthermore, the Judgment established that the forced disappearance of persons “is characterized by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or to provide information on the fate or whereabouts of persons,” and that this element should be present in the definition of the crime because it allows for a “distinction to be made between forced disappearance and other crimes that are usually associated with it, such as kidnapping and homicide, so that adequate evidentiary standards may be applied and The Court affirmed that “[f]or […] a correct definition of the crime, the condition of “State agent” must be set in the broadest possible way. Case of Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico, supra note 5, para. 320 and 321. 17 10