12. All this shows clearly that the dismissal of Mr. Aguinaga Aillón via Congressional Resolution 25-160 took place at a time of overt actions by Congress in a climate that was politically contaminated because of criminal trials being pursued against several members of Ecuador’s political class. These trials would eventually be heard by the judiciary. 13. Thus, as explained in the above paragraphs, the dismissal of Mr. Aguinaga Aillón, and generally, the 2004 reform process, must be seen in context to provide a better picture of the motivations that led to the dismissal of the judges and other officers on the high courts. The motivations leading authorities to dismiss or remove judges cannot be ignored when seeking to understand fully the problem at hand. The judgment does perform this analysis, in general terms, to explain the breach of judicial independence, but as we will see below, it omits one factor of analysis that should have received a differentiated view because of the punitive nature of the congressional resolution by which the victim was removed from his position on the TSE. III. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 14. The judgment reaffirms the Court’s case law concerning the importance of judicial independence as “one of the basic pillars of the guarantees of due process,” protected under Article 8(1) of the Convention in its dual sense: institutionally, which entails protection of the judicial branch as a system from undue interference; and individually, as protection for judges in particular. 15. The judgment reiterates that arbitrary interference with the tenure of judges in their positions is a violation of Article 8(1) of the Convention and that judicial independence redounds to specific guarantees for their protection, including: (i) an appropriate appointment process, (ii) stability and irremovability in office, and (iii) the right to be protected from external pressures. 13 This case thus reiterates the regulatory standard developed by the Court to protect the stability and irremovability of judges in their position: The Court would also address the implications of the guarantee of job stability and irremovability for these authorities, as follows: (i) removal from office may be effected exclusively on allowable grounds, whether through a process that offers judicial guarantees, or because the term of office has ended; (ii) judges may be dismissed only for serious disciplinary breaches or incompetence, and (iii) all actions against judges must be settled pursuant to established standards of judicial conduct and by means of fair, objective, impartial proceedings, under the Constitution or laws. This is mandatory, because the fact that judges may be removed from office at will arouses objective concerns about whether they are able to perform their duties without fear of reprisal. 14 16. It is important, within this conceptual framework, to underscore that the judgment upholds the relationship between protection of judicial independence and the preservation of other fundamental values in the body politic, such as democracy. The judgment states that protection of judges is instrumental as a building block of democracy, as it is the judicial branch that stands as a guarantor to shield human 13 Cf. Case of Aguinaga Aillón v. Ecuador, supra, para. 63. 14 Cf. Case of Aguinaga Aillón v. Ecuador, supra, para. 64. 5